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  INTRODUCTION   
The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) individual mandate was 
controversial from the start and evolved over time into the most 
unpopular provision of the law.1 The requirement to buy health 
insurance or pay a tax was maligned mainly because of its al-
leged invasion on personal liberty and the negative impact on 
principles of federalism.2  
Despite the controversy, however, the mandate served an 
important purpose in enabling the most popular provisions of the 
law—the pre-existing conditions protections, guaranteed issue of 
policies, and community rating, which taken together mean that 
insurance companies must issue policies to everyone and set 
rates without regard to health status.3 These provisions are now 
considered by most to be a moral imperative.4 But in a world 
 
 1. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012), amended by Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. 
No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017), invalidated by Texas v. United States, 340 F. 
Supp. 3d 579 (N.D.Tex. 2018) (pending appeal); Jon Greenberg, How Unpopular 
Is the Obamacare Individual Mandate?, POLITIFACT (Nov. 14, 2017), 
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/nov/14/donald 
-trump/how-unpopular-obamacare-individual-mandate/ (last visited Oct. 27, 
2019) (66% of poll-participating Americans opposed the mandate). 
 2. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012) (describing some exceptions, for instance al-
lowing some rate variance based on age, geography, and smoker-status). 
 4. See Poll: The ACA’s Pre-Existing Condition Protections Remain Popular 
with the Public, Including Republicans, As Legal Challenge Looms This Week, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press 
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where insurers are not permitted to refuse coverage to people 
with pre-existing conditions nor charge them more based on 
their actuarial risk, healthy people can simply wait to buy insur-
ance until they get sick.5 This leaves insurers to cover only a 
sicker, more expensive population. And the higher the cost of the 
risk pool, the higher premiums must be.6 Higher premiums, in 
turn, price people out of the market.7 Even if the market is stable 
enough to avoid the feared “death spiral”8—in part because it 
continues to be steadied by other parts of the ACA including the 
premium tax credits—the trend toward more uninsureds, higher 
premiums, and sicker risk pools is still problematic.9 This is the 
world that the drafters of the ACA attempted to foreclose 
through the individual mandate—by giving healthier policyhold-
ers an important incentive to buy insurance and even out the 




 5. Open enrollment periods moderately mitigate this effect. An “open en-
rollment period” is the annual period when people can enroll in a health insur-
ance plan. Open Enrollment Period, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare 
.gov/glossary/open-enrollment-period/ [perma.cc/W524-28MQ]. If an individual 
gets sick mid-way through the year, she would have to wait until the next open 
enrollment period to enroll in a plan. 
 6. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2486 (2015). 
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 2495 (describing how removing tax credits would push a state’s 
insurance market into a death spiral); David M. Cutler & Richard J. Zeck-
hauser, Adverse Selection in Health Insurance, 1 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 
1, 5–6 (1998) (discussing adverse selection and the result of the “death spiral”); 
Mark A. Hall, Evaluating the Affordable Care Act: The Eye of the Beholder, 51 
HOUS. L. REV. 1029, 1039 (2014) (discussing the troubling signs of an unbal-
anced risk pool (citing Seth Chandler, Even the New York Times Acknowledges 
the ACA Is Collapsing, ACA DEATH SPIRAL (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www 
.acadeathspiral.org/ [https://perma.cc/5W44-VHXV])). 
 9. Brief of Amici Curiae for Bipartisan Economic Scholars in Support of 
Intervenor Defendant-Appellants at *25, Texas v. United States, No. 19-10011 
(5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2019) (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES FOR 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR PEOPLE UNDER AGE 65: 2018 TO 2028, at 2–
3, 5 (2018)). 
 10. I do not take on in this paper the question of whether the ACA’s com-
munity rating approach is the right one. Frequent and fervent debate on this 
question can be found at almost every turn. See, e.g., Michael Lee, Jr., Adverse 
Reactions: Structure, Philosophy, and Outcomes of the Affordable Care Act, 29 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 559, 578 (2011) (claiming the “ACA’s imposition of com-
munity rating would exacerbate adverse selection”); David B. Rivkin, Jr. et al., 
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mandate penalty means these problems deserve renewed atten-
tion. 
Further, the uninsured problem is not one caused only by 
the repeal of the mandate penalty. Even when the mandate was 
enforced, millions of Americans still lacked health insurance. At 
its lowest, in 2016, the uninsured rate among non-elderly adults 
was still about 10% of the population, or 27 million Americans.11 
Young adults (aged twenty-six to thirty-four) were the least 
likely to be insured.12 Putting aside concerns about the stability 
of the individual market, there are other reasons to address the 
insurance problem: high rates of uninsurance lead to worse 
health outcomes and adverse spillover effects for the rest of the 
population that ultimately bears the cost of uncompensated 
care.13 
Health policy debates are now focused on major policy initi-
atives, with a move to a single payer system at the forefront.14 
While these larger debates are undoubtedly important, the pre-
sent political landscape makes any major changes exceedingly 
unlikely in the short term. Meanwhile, the troubling regime 
where so many Americans are not enrolled in a health insurance 
plan receives inadequate attention.  
 
A Healthy Debate: the Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 93, 94–95 (2009) (challenging community rating which tries 
to fund universal coverage by “[m]aking healthy young adults pay billions of 
dollars in premiums into the national health care market . . . .”); David A. Su-
per, The Modernization of American Public Law: Health Care Reform and Pop-
ular Constitutionalism, 66 STAN. L. REV. 873, 947 (2014) (stating ACA’s com-
munity rating redistributed wealth from the healthy to the sick by restricting 
insurance companies’ ability to fully charge people needing extensive care). 
Many other possibilities exist, including separately insuring more costly indi-
viduals in high-risk pools or subsidizing the cost of sicker insureds in mixed risk 
pools. I simply take as a starting point that the intent of the ACA—which re-
mains in effect—was to mix sick and healthy people in the same risk pool. 
 11. Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 
7, 2018), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the 
-uninsured-population/ [https://perma.cc/6XYR-BT4M]. 
 12. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2017 (2018), https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2018/demo/ 
p60-264.html [https://perma.cc/SG5Z-35BY]. 
 13. See discussion infra Parts II.D.1–2. 
 14. Compare Medicare for All Act of 2019, H.R. 1384, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(proposal by Rep. Pramila Jayapal), and Medicare for America Act of 2019, H.R. 
2452, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposal by Rep. Rosa DeLauro), with American 
Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. (2017).  
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This Article takes on that problem. It considers both neo-
classical economic theory and the realities of individual decision-
making described by behavioral economics to begin to grapple 
with the complex problem of why people do not enroll in health 
insurance policies. Building on that theory, it then surveys a uni-
verse of alternatives to the individual mandate, grounded in pri-
vate law principles, designed to incentivize individuals to buy 
health insurance without mandating that they do so.15 These are 
solutions that could be attempted separately or in combination. 
Many could be implemented by insurers with only limited gov-
ernment intervention.  
The first suggestion co-opts tactics with proven success that 
have caused crises when deployed in dangerous ways: longer-
term policies with low introductory rates and limited exit rights. 
These methods have successfully attracted consumers to make 
purchases when it was not in the best interests of society—con-
sider for instance the subprime mortgage crisis—but should be 
revisited for their potential to prompt purchases we now seek to 
encourage. 
Other suggestions respond to various economic rationales 
and cognitive biases that are currently deterring insurance pur-
chase by the young and healthy, including return of premium 
policies, simplified plans, and plans sold according to a generos-
ity frame rather than a rational choice frame. Although it would 
require some legal changes, automatically enrolling individuals 
in plans with the right to opt-out merits serious consideration as 
well.  
All of these solutions take the current reality of our health 
care system at face value.16 None are perfect. And some will be 
 
 15. Most of these alternatives can be achieved through insurer-side action. 
I therefore characterize them as “private law” initiatives because they primarily 
involve changes to contract provisions. Some of the solutions would require Con-
gressional action, although I endeavor to minimize reliance on significant 
changes to the legal framework in recognition of the political climate. See infra 
Part IV for additional detail. Also, see Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines 
for the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks into the Health Insurance Pool with an 
Idea from Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 79, 
79, which lays some early groundwork that I build upon in this Article. 
 16. In other words, if I were designing a system from scratch, it would not 
be the system we currently have. Indeed, many scholars have argued that what 
we have is not fixable. See, e.g., Allison K. Hoffman, Health Care’s Market Bu-
reaucracy, 66 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 9) (on file with 
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more effective for certain sub-populations of the uninsured than 
others.17 In a world of increasing access to consumer data, par-
ticular options could be targeted to the segments of consumers 
most likely to be influenced. But individually or deployed to-
gether, these solutions hold the potential to significantly im-
prove upon the status quo.  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I tells the story of 
the individual mandate, including why it was needed and how it 
was designed to work. It describes the impact that the mandate 
penalty had while it was in effect but also considers the man-
date’s shortcomings.  
Part II sets forth the current problem. The mandate was ab-
horred by many. Consequently, it was effectively repealed. The 
repeal will have a negative impact on the insurance markets. 
Further, there is a persistent problem with uninsurance in 
America that exists even with an enforced mandate. Part II also 
describes the negative implications of decreased health insur-
ance enrollment, beyond just the instability that healthy people 
leaving insurance markets will cause.  
Part III then explores the theoretical underpinnings of this 
complicated problem. There are reasons grounded in both neo-
classical economic theory and behavioral economics that individ-
uals choose not to purchase health insurance. An analysis of 
these reasons is essential to crafting solutions and to assessing 
the likely effectiveness of the solutions.  
Finally, Part IV draws on that theory to introduce a menu 
of alternatives to the individual mandate. It explores both the 
advantages and disadvantages of these various options.  
The world that we currently inhabit is neither the one that 
many Republican thought leaders would prefer—a system that 
relies on delegation to the States—nor the one that most Demo-
crats ultimately seek—universal health care. But with major 
 
UCLA Law Review) (arguing that “health care’s market-based solutions have 
failed” and that they cannot be fixed). I argue that while we strive for major 
health reform, we should continue to try to improve upon the status quo in ways 
that are politically viable. 
 17. As Tom Baker and Peter Siegelman correctly note, “[d]ifferent people 
have different preferences for insurance. Designing new insurance products to 
meet insurance-resistant young people’s preferences offers a potentially prom-
ising new way to entice low risks into the health-insurance pool.” See Baker & 
Siegelman, supra note 15, at 82. 
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policy changes likely still years away, it is a system we must 
nonetheless attempt to fix. Any voluntary solution, grounded in 
private law, that might prompt more healthy insureds to pur-
chase and then maintain policies is worthy of further explora-
tion.  
I.  THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND THE INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATE   
Prior to the ACA, almost fifty million people (over sixteen 
percent of the population) were uninsured.18 In 2010, in an at-
tempt to address the problem, Congress passed and President 
Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act.19 It was landmark health reform legislation—the first 
major change to the delivery of health care in the U.S. since Med-
icare and Medicaid became law in 1965.20 The individual Shared 
Responsibility Payment (or “individual mandate”) was only one 
provision in a web of interconnected provisions intended to make 
health insurance more available and affordable, ultimately to 
address the uninsured problem. But the mandate was an im-
portant tool that facilitated some of the very popular provisions 
of the ACA. 
A. THE JOB THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE WAS SUPPOSED TO DO 
Health insurance exists because health spending is unpre-
dictable. Most people do not know when they will get sick and 
 
 18. See Key Facts About the Uninsured Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/fact-sheet/key-facts-about-the 
-uninsured-population/ [https://perma.cc/6XYR-BT4M]. 
 19. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of the Internal Revenue Code and 42 U.S.C.). 
 20. The ACA has been called a “superstatute” because its implementation 
has changed so much about the delivery of health care. Abbe Gluck, Obamacare 
As Superstatute, BALKINIZATION BLOG (July 29, 2017, 10:18 AM), https://balkin 
.blogspot.com/2017/07/obamacare-as-superstatute.html [https://perma.cc/ 
H5ZH-BDDC] (discussing the “normative transformation” the ACA brought in 
terms of our “gut understanding of what a health care system should be and 
what the government’s role in it should look like”). This is not to minimize other 
advances in health policy. See Timeline: History of Health Reform in the U.S., 
KAISER FAM. FOUND., https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2011/ 
03/5-02-13-history-of-health-reform.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2019), for an in-
formative overview of health reform. 
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how much it will cost them when they do. And most people are, 
at least to a degree, risk averse.21 When given a choice between 
a two percent risk of having to pay $30,000 for medical treatment 
or paying $600 in premiums, many if not most would choose the 
premium.22 Health insurance works when an individual who 
faces a risk agrees to pay a premium to an insurance company, 
which in turn agrees to bear that risk (at least partially, if not 
entirely) for the insured.23 
But a health insurance system can be designed in two fun-
damentally different ways: either based on principles of actuar-
ial fairness or social solidarity.24 A system is actuarially sound if 
it attempts to match premium charges with insurance risk.25 Put 
simply, individuals who are likely to incur higher claims costs 
are charged higher premiums than those likely to incur lower 
claims costs. An individual who is obese or who has diabetes or 
who has a family history of early-onset breast cancer will, by de-
sign, be charged higher premiums than a young, healthy indi-
vidual with family members who lived to old age and died of nat-
ural causes.26 An actuarially fair health care system requires an 
underwriting process to assess risk.27 Individuals who apply for 
insurance must provide detailed health information and family 
 
 21. See generally Ted O’Donoghue & Jason Somerville, Modeling Risk Aver-
sion in Economics, 32 J. ECON. PERSP. 91 (2018) (explaining the relevance of 
risk aversion for understanding economics, including discussion of insurance 
policies).  
 22. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTHCARE 5 (2017), 
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mankiw/files/economics_of_healthcare.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KL2W-3B4M]. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health 
Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 134 n.18 (2011) 
(citing sources describing the tradeoffs between actuarial fairness and social 
solidarity); Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 
J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 287, 289 (1993) (discussing the distinction between 
actuarial fairness and social solidarity). 
 25. Stone, supra note 24, at 293 (describing a system based in actuarial 
fairness and contrasting it with a system based on social solidarity). 
 26. Arguably, the most desirable insured is someone whose family members 
died young of non-chronic conditions. 
 27. Stone, supra note 24, at 294 (“Underwriting is the process insurers use 
to find ‘the best and most desirable insureds.’”). 
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history so that underwriters can set rates that, to the best of 
their ability to predict, approximate anticipated cost.28  
Prior to 2010, the individual health insurance market was 
predicated on an actuarial fairness model.29 This meant that 
many young, healthy individuals could obtain coverage at rela-
tively low rates, while older and sicker policyholders either paid 
much higher rates or were denied coverage entirely. These rates 
were “fair” because they reflected an individual’s likely cost to 
the insurer.30 A system based in actuarial fairness, however, 
does not attempt to be redistributive or to be morally fair.31 And 
the reality of the pre-ACA system was that nearly fifty million 
Americans did not have health insurance,32 even though, for 
most of them, their conditions were not their fault.33 
 
 28. Id. (“The more durable (long-lived) and well-made (resistant to disease) 
the policyholders are, the more money the insurance company makes.”). 
 29. See Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1599–602 
(2011) (describing the premium implications for people under actuarial fairness 
insurance models); Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 24, at 135–36 (describing 
the pre-ACA model). 
 30. Baker, supra note 29, at 1600 (“Within the framework of actuarial fair-
ness, a price is unfairly discriminatory when two people presenting the same 
risk are charged different prices for the same product, but not when two people 
presenting different risks are charged different prices.”). 
 31. This is at least the case in a world where other provision is not being 
made to cover higher risk individuals. See Stone, supra note 24, at 308 (“The 
principle actually distributes medical care in inverse relation to need, and to the 
large extent that commercial insurers operate on this principle, the American 
reliance on the private sector as its main provider of health insurance estab-
lishes a system that is perfectly and perversely designed to keep sick people 
away from doctors.”). 
 32. Dan Managan, Obamacare Kept Reducing Number of Americans With-
out Health Insurance During Trump’s First Months in Office, CNBC (Aug. 26, 
2017 8:13 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/29/obamacare-kept-reducing 
-number-of-americans-without-health-insurance.html [https://perma.cc/PYY6 
-HVFM] (“In 2010, 16 percent of Americans, or 48.6 million people, were unin-
sured . . . .”). 
 33. Prior to the ACA, most states maintained high-risk pools, where indi-
viduals who could not obtain coverage by other means could get state-subsidized 
insurance. See High-Risk Pools, HEALTH REFORM TRACKER, http://www 
.healthreformtracker.org/high-risk-pools/ [https://perma.cc/H2XZ-SVSF] (ex-
plaining the structure of high-risk pools and their successes and failures). This 
Article takes no position on whether adequately-funded high risk pools would 
have solved the pre-ACA problems. But risk-pools pre-ACA were not adequately 
funded and were problematic for many reasons, ranging from caps on enroll-
ment, caps on reimbursement, failure to provide coverage for the pre-existing 
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The Affordable Care Act was, in large part, an attempt to 
address this problem. It marked a move from an actuarial fair-
ness approach toward a social solidarity approach. A social soli-
darity system makes no attempt to match risk and rate.34 Ra-
ther, it spreads cost evenly over the covered population.35 
Medicare is just one example of a social solidarity system.36 
When an individual turns sixty-five, he or she is automatically 
enrolled in Medicare.37 And for Part B, which charges premiums, 
premiums are assessed without regard to individual risk.38 Es-
sentially, every insured bears an equal percentage of the cost 
even if the claims costs paid out for one individual are higher 
than for another individual.  
 
conditions itself, and the list goes on. See Julie Rovner & Francis Ying, Sounds 
Like a Good Idea? High-Risk Pools, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (May 4, 2017), 
https://khn.org/news/sounds-like-a-good-idea-high-risk-pools/ [https://perma.cc/ 
K8HA-KCU9] (explaining high-risk pools and why they did not work in the 
past); see also Harris Meyer, Why High-Risk Pools Won’t Crack the Pre-existing 
Condition Dilemma, MODERN HEALTHCARE (Feb. 13, 2017, 12:00 AM), https:// 
www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170213/NEWS/170219968 [https:// 
perma.cc/AY34-4GLY] (“[E]xperts say that state high-risk pools generally were 
a policy failure across the country, and making them work properly would re-
quire a large amount of taxpayer funding.”). 
 34. See Karl Hinrichs, Social Insurances and the Culture of Solidarity: The 
Moral Infrastructure of Interpersonal Redistributions with Special Reference to 
the German Health Care System 7 (Ctr. Soc. Policy Research, Working Paper 
No. 3/1997) (“[A] uniform contribution (rate) unrelated to the risk status is ap-
plied for all members of the insured collectivity.”).  
 35. Id.  
 36. Notably, though, Medicare does not simply pool costs and charge every-
one the same premium because it relies substantially on general revenue fund-
ing from the entire tax base. The larger point is that it covers everyone and does 
not charge sicker people higher rates. See generally An Overview of Medicare, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 13, 2019), https://kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/an 
-overview-of-medicare/ [https://perma.cc/DL4H-A2WC] (providing an overview 
of the Medicare system, including coverage details and how it is financed). 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2012). 
 38. There is no Premium for Part A. The premiums assessed for Part B do 
differ somewhat based on ability to pay, but not based on actuarial risk. SOCIAL 
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PUB. NO. 05-10536, MEDICARE PREMIUMS: RULES 
FOR HIGHER-INCOME BENEFICIARIES (2019), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05 
-10536.pdf. 
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A central motivating idea behind the ACA was to address 
the immorality of turning away sick people from insurance cov-
erage or charging astronomically high premiums to cover them.39 
As such, the ACA’s health insurance “Market Reforms”40 were 
born. These reforms do several things. First, they guarantee 
availability of coverage, meaning that insurers can no longer 
turn away prospective insureds who are “bad risks.”41 Second, 
they prohibit insurers from discriminating against those with 
pre-existing conditions or risky health statuses, including based 
on genetic information.42 And they implement so-called “[f]air 
health insurance premiums,” otherwise known as “community 
rating,” which mandates that rates vary only by individual or 
family, rating area, age (but not more than 3:1 for adults), and 
tobacco use (not more than 1.5:1). Basically, everyone is charged 
(close to) the same regardless of risk.43 
By these provisions, the ACA prevents insurers from turn-
ing away more expensive insureds or charging them higher 
rates, which had been the pre-ACA approach.44 Before the ACA, 
insurers could keep premiums down by choosing to cover only 
lower-risk and lower-cost individuals (or by refusing to pay for 
high-cost care). After the ACA, insurers must include sicker and 
more expensive insureds in their risk pools. 
The ACA was designed to work, however, by attracting suf-
ficient numbers of younger, healthier, lower-cost individuals into 
 
 39. See The Affordable Care Act’s Individual Mandate Helps Make Health 
Insurance Affordable and Available, FAMILIES USA (Nov. 2017), https:// 
familiesusa.org/product/affordable-care-act-individual-mandate-helps-make 
-health-insurance-affordable [https://perma.cc/V6XR-8852] (explaining that 
premiums skyrocketed when states were required to cover individuals with 
preexisting conditions and healthy individuals were not required to enroll). 
 40. Jennifer Tolbert, The Coverage Provisions in the Affordable Care Act: 
An Update, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 2, 2015), https://www.kff.org/report 
-section/the-coverage-provisions-in-the-affordable-care-act-an-update-health 
-insurance-market-reforms/ [https://perma.cc/VU85-MUMT] (detailing the mar-
ket reforms established by the ACA). 
 41. Public Health Service Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-410, 58 Stat. 682 (cod-
ified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1 (2012)). 
 42. Id. §§ 2704–2705 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-3 to gg-4 
(2012)). These protections began even before the ACA with the Genetic Infor-
mation Nondiscrimination Act of 2008. See Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 
(2008). 
 43. Id. § 2701 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2012)). 
 44. See supra notes 29–31. 
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the risk pools to even out the cost of the sicker ones.45 Two mech-
anisms were used to do this. First, the ACA makes subsidies 
available to lower-income individuals.46 Those who make less 
than 400% of the federal poverty level receive premium tax cred-
its that essentially work to lower premiums and make them af-
fordable.47 Second, because lower-cost individuals might balk at 
paying more than their fair actuarial share and choose not to 
enroll at all, the ACA included an individual mandate.48 
The mandate required that most individuals49 prove that 
they had qualifying insurance coverage or else pay a penalty. 
The penalty was assessed through the tax system: when filing 
taxes, individuals were required to submit a form demonstrating 
that they had maintained essential coverage throughout the 
year, or pay a tax.50  
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MANDATE: BOTH SUCCESSES AND 
FAILURES  
The mandate was first implemented in 2014. That year, the 
penalty was $95 per adult or 1% of family income, whichever was 
 
 45. See Illana Graetz et al., Lessons Learned From the Affordable Care Act: 
The Premium Subsidy Design May Promote Adverse Selection, 75 MED. CARE 
RES. & REV. 762, 768 (2018) (“To achieve a balanced risk pool and curtail con-
tinued premium growth, the ACA marketplaces need to attract sufficient num-
bers of younger, healthier individuals.”); Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: 
Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 7, 12 (2010) (describing the redistributive policy objective of the 
individual mandate).  
 46. Explaining Health Care Reform: Questions About Health Insurance 
Subsidies, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health 
-reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-care-reform-questions-about-health/ 
[https://perma.cc/U3WD-HQU5]. 
 47. Key Facts: Premium Tax Credit, HEALTH REFORM: BEYOND THE BASICS 
(Sept. 13, 2018), http://www.healthreformbeyondthebasics.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/08/KeyFacts_Premium-Tax-Credits.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN45 
-25BF]. 
 48. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (2012). Cost-sharing reduction payments also re-
duce out-of-pocket costs for eligible insureds. Key Facts: Premium Tax Credit, 
supra note 47. 
 49. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b)(1). However, some people were exempt. See id. 
§§ 5000A(d)(2)(A), (d)(3)–(4), (e)(1)–(5). 
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greater.51 Gradually, the penalties increased until they hit their 
maximum in 2016 of $695 per adult or 2.5% of income, whichever 
was greater.52 
In many respects, the mandate successfully incentivized the 
purchase of insurance policies. The best evidence is that nearly 
twenty million previously uninsured people became insured fol-
lowing the ACA’s implementation.53 
Of that number, about half purchased policies on the Ex-
changes and half received coverage through the Medicaid expan-
sion.54  
The mandate does not deserve sole credit for this reduction 
in uninsureds. Strong economic growth during this period sup-
ported enrollment55 and the premium tax credits (usually re-
ferred to as “subsidies”) also made it possible for many poorer 
 
 51. Matthew Rae et al., The Cost of the Individual Mandate Penalty for the 
Remaining Uninsured, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 9, 2015), https://kff.org/ 
health-reform/issue-brief/the-cost-of-the-individual-mandate-penalty-for-the 
-remaining-uninsured/ [https://perma.cc/XMD8-LDNE]. 
 52. The Fee for Not Having Health Insurance, supra note 50. 
 53. See NAMRATA UBEROI ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE AND THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, 2010–2016, at 
2 (2016), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/187551/ACA2010-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HC4T-X6RZ]; see also KAISER FAM. FOUND., NO. 8306-T, SUR-
VEY OF NON-GROUP HEALTH INSURANCE ENROLLEES, (June 2014), https:// 
www.kff.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/8306-t2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S7Z 
-AX7C] (presenting survey results examining views and experiences of individ-
uals who purchase health insurance through insurance companies or the ACA). 
But the uninsured rate has been trending higher since the start of the Trump 
Administration and its attempts to undermine the ACA. A total of 12.2% of all 
adults now lack health insurance, an increase of 1.3 percentage points since the 
last quarter of 2016. Zac Auter, U.S. Uninsured Rate Steady at 12.2% in Fourth 
Quarter of 2017, GALLUP (Jan. 16, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/225383/ 
uninsured-rate-steady-fourth-quarter-2017.aspx [https://perma.cc/FD49 
-UQ3A]. 
 54. The twenty million previously uninsured who obtained insurance post-
ACA also includes about two million young adults who obtained insurance be-
cause of the ACA provision that allowed them to stay on their parents’ plans 
until age twenty-six. See Tara O’Neill Hayes, How Many Are Newly Insured as 
a Result of the ACA?, AM. ACTION FORUM (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www 
.americanactionforum.org/insight/20-million/ [https://perma.cc/F7QC-CXQZ]. 
 55. JOHN HOLAHAN ET AL., URBAN INST., U.S. HEALTH REFORM—MONI-
TORING AND IMPACT: THE EVIDENCE ON RECENT HEALTH CARE SPENDING 
GROWTH AND THE IMPACT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT at 9–11 (2017), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/90471/2001288-the_ 
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individuals to afford insurance that they could not afford be-
fore.56 Because the mandate and the subsidies were imple-
mented at the same time, it is hard to empirically separate the 
effect that one had relative to the other. 
Nonetheless, there is good reason to believe that the man-
date provided an important (while not the only) incentive for en-
rollment.57 Massachusetts had implemented a similar scheme 
prior to the ACA.58 There, a population of individuals had access 
to subsidies to purchase insurance both before and after the im-
plementation of a mandate. Even when the subsidies were held 
constant, a higher percentage of individuals chose to buy insur-
ance when subject to the mandate than they did without a man-
date.59 It seems likely, therefore, that the ACA mandate also 
prompted new enrollments. 
This, however, does not answer the question of who enrolled 
because of the mandate. Recall that a main rationale for the 
mandate was to prompt younger, healthier, and therefore less 
costly enrollees. 
Here, there is limited data.60 We know that for the coveted 
bracket of individuals aged nineteen to thirty-four, the unin-
sured rate dropped from 29.9% (before the ACA) to 17.3% (after 




 56. Explaining Health Care Reform: Questions About Health Insurance 
Subsidies, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health 
-reform/issue-brief/explaining-health-care-reform-questions-about-health/ 
[https://perma.cc/U3WD-HQU5]. 
 57. Notably, the incentive may not be a desire to avoid the financial pen-
alty, but rather a desire to comply.  
 58. See Christine Eibner & Sarah Nowak, The Effect of Eliminating the In-
dividual Mandate Penalty and the Role of Behavioral Factors, COMMONWEALTH 
FUND (July 11, 2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund 
-reports/2018/jul/eliminating-individual-mandate-penalty-behavioral-factors 
[https://perma.cc/L3BC-B3VF]. 
 59. See id. 
 60. Insurance companies surely have this data. They have the claims costs 
of the insured and could assess how many lower-cost individuals registered for 
insurance post-ACA. 
 61. See BOWEN GARRETT & ANUJ GANGOPADHYAYA, URBAN INST., ACA IM-
PLEMENTATION—MONITORING AND TRACKING: WHO GAINED HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE COVERAGE UNDER THE ACA, AND WHERE DO THEY LIVE? 4 (2016), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/86761/2001041-who 
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eighteen to thirty-four made up about 28% of enrollees on the 
Exchanges.62 So there was at least some success attracting 
young policyholders. 
But there is also evidence that the mandate did not attract 
enough low-risk policyholders. Anecdotally, insurers reported 
that they “saw very little of the young and healthy.”63 Many ac-
tuaries calculated that younger policyholders needed to make up 
40% of the risk pool “to create a more stable rate environment.”64 
And the Exchanges did not produce that.65 There is also evidence 
from insurers that medical costs were higher than expected from 
2014 to 2017, suggesting that risk pools attracted more sick peo-
ple than healthy people.66  
 
-gained-health-insurance-coverage-under-the-aca-and-where-do-they-live.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L3BC-B3VF]. But see Hayes, supra note 54 (describing new 
rules permitting children to stay on parental plans until age twenty-six par-
tially explain the drop). And for those aged thirty-five to fifty-four, the unin-
sured rate also dropped—from 19.6% to 13.3%. GARRETT & GANGOPADHYAYA, 
supra, at 4. 
 62. Bob Herman, What, Me Buy Insurance? How Slow Uptake by “Young 
Invincibles” Is Driving the ACA’s Exchange Rates Higher, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE (May 14, 2016), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/ 
20160514/MAGAZINE/305149980 [https://perma.cc/Z7Y9-BV6U]. 
 63. Id. (quoting Sherri Huff, “a consultant and former chief financial officer 
of Common Ground Healthcare Cooperative in Wisconsin, one of the insurance 
co-ops funded by ACA loans”).  
 64. Id.; Mike Walden, You Decide: How Is Economics Involved in Health 
Insurance?, N.C. ST. U.: CALS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2017), https://cals.ncsu.edu/news/ 
you-decide-how-is-economics-involved-in-health-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/ 
D48Y-4PJC] (“One study estimated that for Obamacare to work, 40 percent of 
enrollees needed to be young people (18–34 age group). But the actual share has 
only been about 25 percent. The lack of sufficient numbers of younger enrollees 
is one reason why Obamacare premiums have risen more than expected.”).  
 65. See DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET-
PLACE: SUMMARY ENROLLMENT REPORT FOR THE INITIAL ANNUAL OPEN EN-
ROLLMENT PERIOD at 3 (2014), https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/76876/ib_ 
2014Apr_enrollment.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2NA-4766] (showing that young 
adults made up 31% of individuals selecting health insurance plans between 
October 1, 2013 and March 31, 2014). 
 66. Evidence shows that medical costs were 6% to 10% higher in 2014 than 
in the prior year. Allison Inserro, Claims Costs, Policy Decisions Factors in 
Early ACA Insurer Participation, GAO Report Says, AJMC (Jan. 31, 2019), 
https://www.ajmc.com/focus-of-the-week/claims-costs-policy-decisions-factors 
-in-early-aca-insurer-participation-gao-report-says [https://perma.cc/957Q 
-EV2S]. Rate increases may be attributed to insurer difficulty in predicting 
claims experiences without experience rating. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
  
1444 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1429 
 
 
Perhaps the strongest evidence that the mandate was not 
entirely successful in attracting less expensive policyholders is 
the rise of premiums post-ACA. These increases were signifi-
cant, particularly in certain geographic locations—although rate 
increases are more modest when they are weighted by number 
of enrollees in specific plans.67 And even at its lowest, the unin-
sured rate for non-elderly adults still did not go below 10% of the 
population.68 
There are many reasons why the mandate might not have 
been entirely successful. Two are particularly salient: the man-
date was not strong enough, and errors in its design prevented 
it from having the full, intended effect.69 
First, the amount of the tax was much less than the cost of 
the cheapest plan. As Dr. Kevin Volpp, a Wharton health econo-
mist, put it: “An individual could quite rationally conclude, ‘I’m 
willing to pay a $700 penalty. I’m not willing to pay $4,000 or 
more for my coverage.’”70 A mandate that was more similar in 
price to the lowest price plan would likely have prompted more 
sign-ups. But the larger and more punitive the mandate, the less 
likely that it would have been deemed constitutional.71 
Second, the consequence of having to pay the penalty was 
far removed from the decision point to purchase insurance.72 The 
 
FICE, GAO-19-215, HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGES: CLAIMS COSTS AND FED-
ERAL AND STATE POLICIES DROVE ISSUER PARTICIPATION, PREMIUMS, AND PLAN 
DESIGN 10–11 (2019).  
 67. Prices did go up, but maybe not by as much as people think. See Peter 
Ubel, Everyone Agrees Obamacare Prices Have Been Rising Rapidly. But Every-
one Is Wrong., FORBES (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/ 
2018/02/23/everyone-agrees-obamacare-prices-have-been-rising-rapidly-heres 
-why-everyone-is-wrong/#70f3c1a5b19c [https://perma.cc/9UTK-UJER ] (argu-
ing that price increases look a lot smaller when number of enrollees per plan 
are considered). 
 68. See KAISER FAM. FOUND., supra note 11. 
 69. Ideological objections to the mandate also likely had an impact. See dis-
cussion infra Part II.A.  
 70. How Behavioral Economics Could Save America’s Health Care Woes, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (May 12, 2017), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/ 
article/four-general-principles-health-care-reform/ [https://perma.cc/R7BB 
-PTJ2].  
 71. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 572–73 
(2012) (finding the individual mandate to be constitutional as a proper exercise 
of Congressional taxing authority, but noting that it could not be punitive). 
 72. See Behavioral Economics, supra note 70. 
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time lag between open enrollment and the filing of taxes could 
be almost a year and a half.73 People are much more likely to 
focus on immediate consequences. As such, the mandate likely 
did not pack the punch that lawmakers intended. 
Despite its failure to fully accomplish the goals set forth for 
it,74 the mandate did serve an important purpose in prompting 
insurance uptake. And yet the next Part describes how the op-
position to the mandate led to the repeal of the penalty. It then 
describes the negative impact that the repeal is likely to have on 
the markets and uninsured rates in the near future. It also takes 
up the problem of high rates of uninsurance even when the man-
date was in effect. 
II.  THE REPEAL OF THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE   
The individual mandate was always highly unpopular. Ac-
cording to most polls, around 66% of Americans were opposed to 
it75 and over 80% of Trump supporters opposed it.76 This public 
opposition ultimately fed the political will to repeal the mandate, 
removing a key (even if imperfect) incentive for insurance enroll-
ment. 
A. OBJECTIONS TO THE MANDATE   
There were two major legal and policy objections to the man-
date (aside from debates about whether or not it was effective): 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. See Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, 
Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 12 (2010) (pre-
dicting that “the individual mandate will not be able to realize such benefits 
that rely upon its ability to promote health redistribution if it is implemented 
in a fragmented health insurance market”). 
 75. Jon Greenberg, How Unpopular Is the Obamacare Individual Man-
date?, POLITIFACT (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/ 
statements/2017/nov/14/donald-trump/how-unpopular-obamacare-individual 
-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/589J-3C69]; Tara O’Neill Hayes, Alternative Policy 
Options to the Individual Mandate, AM. ACTION F. (June 20, 2017), https://www 
.americanactionforum.org/insight/alternative-policy-options-individual 
-mandate/#ixzz5fR0fISUz [https://perma.cc/589J-3C69]. 
 76. ASHLEY KIRZINGER ET AL., KAISER FAM. FOUND., KAISER HEALTH 
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it infringed on individual liberty and autonomy, and it violated 
the proper operation of federalism.77  
First, the mandate was viewed as coercive in the sense that 
it violated economic liberty. It forced people to buy insurance 
that they did not want. Young people, so the argument went, 
may “choose not to buy insurance precisely because they do not 
expect to use medical care much—and usually they don’t.”78 The 
mandate amounted to a coercion of these individuals to enter 
into private contracts, which in many cases were contrary to 
their self-interest.79 This theory of liberal autonomy, emphasiz-
ing self-determination, was largely adopted by the majority of 
the Supreme Court in its commerce clause analysis in NFIB v. 
Sebelius, the case challenging the constitutionality of the man-
date.80 Although the Court went on to uphold the mandate on 
other grounds, it found that Congress lacked authority to man-
date the purchase of insurance under the commerce clause.81 
 
 77. See also Ezra Klein, Unpopular Mandate, NEW YORKER (June 18, 2012), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/06/25/unpopular-mandate [https:// 
perma.cc/59FV-ZAF9] (arguing that opposition to the mandate grew largely as 
it became a “conservative issue,” even among people who had previously sup-
ported it). 
 78. Rivkin, Jr., supra note 10, at 94; see also Steven Z. Hodaszy, Testing for 
Regulatory Penalties: Insuring the Health of Federalism in the Age of Obamac-
are, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 145, 159–60 (2016); Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To 
Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 83 (2012) (describing conservative 
and Tea Party arguments against the mandate). 
 79. Abigail R. Moncrieff, Safeguarding the Safeguards: The ACA Litigation 
and the Extension of Indirect Protection to Nonfundamental Liberties, 64 FLA. 
L. REV. 639, 668 (2012). Another autonomy-based argument concerned freedom 
of health. This argument gained less traction, though, because nothing about 
the mandate forced anyone into a health care decision—just a decision about 
health insurance. As Abigail Moncrieff stated, “In short, the individual mandate 
does not require Americans to ‘eat their broccoli’—only to pay for it.” Id. at 671.; 
see also Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 
2247 (2011). 
 80. 567 U.S. 519, 545–55 (2012). 
 81. See Catherine A. Hardee, Considering Consequences: Autonomy’s Miss-
ing Half, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 785, 788 (2016). It is worth noting that coercion may 
be warranted. See Scotty Jenkins, Republicans’ Proposed “Continuous Cover-
age” Protections Are Even More Coercive Than Obamacare’s Individual Man-
date, RANTT MEDIA (Jan. 7, 2017), https://medium.com/rantt/republicans 
-proposed-continuous-coverage-protections-are-even-more-coercive-than 
-obamacare-s-6340dedb2d44 [https://perma.cc/KU9R-4E27] (“The Republicans 
are right that the individual mandate is coercive. But they’re wrong that it is, 
in principle, immoral or otherwise undesirable because it’s coercive. Coercion 
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There are lots of responses to the autonomy concerns, both 
as a legal matter and a policy matter, including that the man-
date simply responded to the costs that the uninsured external-
ized onto the insured when they obtained emergency room care 
for which they could not pay. Essentially, the mandate was a 
valid response to the free-rider problem. But the larger point is 
that the perceived coercive nature of the mandate was always a 
significant stumbling block in its adoption and viability. 
Second, many objected to the individual mandate because it 
exemplified an overreach of authority on the part of the federal 
government. Indeed, the core argument in NFIB v. Sebelius was 
just that—that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to 
regulate, and that the issue should instead be left to the states.82 
Put another way, “the individual mandate exceeds Congress’s af-
firmative powers as a matter of federalism doctrine.”83 In gen-
eral, many objected to the federal government assuming such 
pervasive authority over an issue that had traditionally been the 
province of the individual states.84 
As a legal matter, this argument did not carry the day. The 
Supreme Court held the mandate to be a valid exercise of Con-
gressional taxing authority within the limited power of the fed-
eral government.85 But particularly when viewed together with 
 
can be justified if it achieves other things we value, like providing access to 
health insurance to as many people as possible.”). 
 82. Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 1723, 1737 (2011); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Affordable Care Act 
Litigation: The Standing Paradox, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 410, 435–36 (2012) (“The 
core legal question before the Supreme Court in the ACA litigation is the scope 
of federal enumerated powers vis-a-vis states’ reserved powers.”). 
 83. Smith, supra note 82, at 1737. 
 84. See Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE 
L.J.F. 1, 2–3 (2017); Bridget A. Fahey, Health Care Exchanges and the Disaggre-
gation of States in the Implementation of the Affordable Care Act, 125 YALE 
L.J.F. 56, 57 (2015); Thomas C. Feeney, Federalism Under Attack: How 
Obamacare Turns Citizens into Government Minions, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 
3, 2010), http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdf/hl_1154.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/TB6N-ASEB]; Edmund Haislmaier & Brian Blase, Obamacare: Im-
pact on States, HERITAGE FOUND. (July 1, 2010), https://www.heritage.org/ 
health-care-reform/report/obamacare-impact-states [https://perma.cc/J3RW 
-2YJ6]. 
 85. NFIB, 567 U.S. 519, 575 (2012). 
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the perceived coercive nature of the law, many continued to ob-
ject to the mandate on federalism grounds.86 And despite the out-
come of NFIB v. Sebelius, the political will to repeal the mandate 
only continued to grow. 
B. THE 2017 REPEAL OF THE MANDATE PENALTY 
As soon as the ACA became law in 2010, Republicans rallied 
around repealing it. From 2010 to 2017, Congress considered 
more than one-hundred resolutions to do away with—in one re-
spect or another—the ACA.87 But the popularity of the pre-exist-
ing conditions protections and other ACA provisions proved a 
significant stumbling block. After seven years of failed repeal at-
tempts, the GOP changed course. 
Instead of attempting to repeal the entire ACA, it targeted 
instead one highly unpopular ACA provision: the individual 
mandate. In December 2017, buried in a 560-page tax reconcili-
ation act,88 Congress effectively repealed the individual man-
date.89 As a technical matter, the mandate remains in the ACA 
and still requires that individuals maintain minimum essential 
coverage for each month. However, the tax act zeroes out the 
penalties the mandate had imposed. Therefore, those who do not 
maintain insurance no longer have any consequence for non-
compliance. Because Congressional authority to issue the man-
date resided only in its taxing powers, with the tax gone, the 
mandate is, for all intents and purposes, repealed.90 
 
 86. Steven Z. Hodaszy, Testing for Regulatory Penalties: Insuring the 
Health of Federalism in the Age of Obamacare, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 145, 160–61 
(2016). 
 87. 100: The Resolutions, HOW MANY TIMES HAS THE HOUSE VOTED TO RE-
PEAL OBAMACARE?, http://howmanytimeshasthehousevotedtorepealobamacare 
.com/ [https://perma.cc/KDD2-75ZR]. 
 88. H.R. REP. No. 115-466, at 324 (2017) (Conf. Rep.).  
 89. Id. The repeal of the mandate was justified by its financial savings to 
the federal government. See generally MATTHEW BUETTGENS ET AL., URBAN 
INST., THE COST OF ACA REPEAL (2016). If fewer low-income individuals pur-
chase policies, then the federal government will owe less in subsidies. Id. 
 90. Because the mandate still technically exists, law-abiding citizens may 
feel compelled to comply with it regardless of whether a penalty is associated. 
See infra Part II.C.1; see also Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 529, 619 
(N.D. Tex. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-10011 (5th Cir. Jan 7, 2019) (consid-
ering whether the entirety of the ACA must also fall with the repeal of the man-
date penalty).  
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The repeal of the mandate penalty first went into effect in 
January 2019.91 Individuals who fail to maintain health insur-
ance for any month in 2019 will no longer be assessed a penalty 
when taxes are due in April 2020. It is too soon to know with 
certainty what effect this will have. Ultimately, it is an empirical 
question. But there is reason to fear a host of negative conse-
quences. 
C. NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE REPEAL 
The most troubling consequences of the repeal flow from the 
inevitability that more Americans will either choose—or be 
forced—to become uninsured. Indeed, the Congressional Budget 
Office has estimated that thirteen million more Americans will 
become uninsured over the next ten years as a result of the re-
peal of the penalty.92 Although the once-feared “death spiral,” 
where markets were expected to collapse, is now unlikely due to 
other market-stabilizing features of the ACA,93 the rise in the 
uninsured population will lead to higher premiums.94  
While insurance markets are not facing imminent collapse 
absent a mandate penalty, the concerns underlying the “death 
spiral” theory persist.95 Those concerns stem from the concept of 
adverse selection, which occurs when individuals know more 
about their health status than insurance companies do. Those in 
poorer health therefore sign up for the most robust coverage, 
 
 91. H.R. REP. No. 115-466, at 40, 324. 
 92. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPEALING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSUR-
ANCE MANDATE: AN UPDATED ESTIMATE at 1 (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/ 
system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53300-individualmandate.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B28Y-RBZG]. There is debate on the accuracy of this estima-
tion, although there is wide agreement on the trend direction toward higher 
rates of uninsureds. 
 93. Brief of Amici Curiae for Bipartisan Economic Scholars in Support of 
Intervenor Defendant-Appellants at 26, Texas, No. 19-10011 (5th Cir. Apr. 1, 
2019), https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53826 [https://perma.cc/5WCU-BNYX] 
[hereinafter Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars] (citing CONG. BUDGET OF-
FICE, FEDERAL SUBSIDIES FOR HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR PEOPLE UN-
DER AGE 65: 2018 TO 2028, at 2–3, 5 (May 2018)) .  
 94. Indeed, the repeal of the penalty has already “caused the number of 
uninsured to rise, increased premiums for those who remain insured, and had 
a serious negative effect on the economy . . .” Id. at 4 (arguing that these effects 
might continue to marginally increase but that the consequences of invalidating 
the entire ACA would be far worse). 
 95. Cutler & Zeckhauser, supra note 8, at 8. 
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knowing that they will need to utilize the benefits offered, and 
those in good health sign up for the skimpiest coverage. Healthy 
individuals may also choose to forego coverage entirely, particu-
larly as premiums increase. In a world where no one has any 
extra incentive to buy insurance (such as having to pay a penalty 
if one goes without it), sicker people will continue to purchase 
policies but many healthy people will not.96 This skews the risk 
pools, which start to contain more expensive, sicker insureds.97 
In order to account for the higher claims costs of a sicker risk 
pool, insurance companies raise premiums. Then as premiums 
increase, fewer healthy policyholders, doing a cost-benefit anal-
ysis, find the cost of premiums to be worth it relative to their 
anticipated health expenses. So those healthier policyholders 
drop out of the risk pool, and the risk pool gets increasingly 
sicker and more expensive over time. If this effect is severe, and 
premiums keep increasing and risk pools keep contracting, then 
the whole market collapses, resulting in the “death spiral.”98 
Economists are in wide agreement that repeal of the man-
date penalty will cause some enrollees to drop coverage. Young 
and healthy policyholders (sometimes called the “young invinci-
bles”),99 are likely to comprise a sizable percentage of the newly 
uninsured—in part because they have fewer financial resources 
to spend on premiums and because they know they are less likely 
to need to use their coverage (although there is still risk). Pre-
mium increases will also cause additional individuals, who 
would no longer be able to afford policies, to become unin-
sured.100 
 
 96. See Rebecca Adams, GAO Examines Alternatives to Individual Man-
date, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Mar. 25, 2011), https://www.commonwealthfund 
.org/publications/newsletter-article/gao-examines-alternatives-individual 
-mandate [https://perma.cc/BJC2-8CKQ]. 
 97. See Jonathan S. Skinner & Kevin G. Volpp, Replacing the Affordable 
Care Act: Lessons from Behavioral Economics, 317 JAMA 1951 (2017). 
 98. Behavioral Economics, supra note 70 (describing how premiums climb 
when “lower-risk people differentially decide not to buy coverage”). 
 99. See, e.g., Baker & Siegelman, supra note 15, at 79 (2010) (describing 
young invincibles as “those who (wrongly) believe that they do not need health 
insurance because they will not get sick”). 
 100. With the subsidies, those making under 400% of the federal poverty 
level are insulated from these rate increases. If premiums increase, the govern-
ment simply pays a higher percentage of the rate. But rate increases are partic-
ularly salient for the lower middle class who make above 400% of the federal 
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While economists are in wide agreement that the uninsured 
rate will increase and that premiums will go up, estimates of de-
gree vary.101 One recent study issued by California’s insurance 
marketplace estimates that insurance premiums for ACA plans 
will jump by 35% to 94%, depending on the state, in the next 
three years.102 Another study finds that just in 2019, premiums 
for silver-level plans are already 15% higher.103 But the latest 
estimate from the Congressional Budget Office predicts pre-
mium increases on average of 7% between 2019 and 2028.104 
 
poverty level and therefore do not qualify for subsidies, but are nonetheless not 
wealthy. 
 101. Auter, supra note 53. “Gallup noted that ‘it seems likely that the unin-
sured rate will rise further in the years ahead,’ given the effective repeal, start-
ing in 2019, of Obamacare’s requirement that most Americans have some form 
of health insurance or pay a fine.” Dan Mangan, Number of Americans Without 
Health Insurance Jumped by More Than 3 Million Under Trump, CNBC (Jan. 
16, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/16/americans-without-health 
-insurance-up-more-than-3-million-under-trump.html [https://perma.cc/FL28 
-6QMN]; see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, REPEALING THE INDIVIDUAL HEALTH 
INSURANCE MANDATE: AN UPDATED ESTIMATE (2017), https://www.cbo.gov/ 
system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53300-individualmandate.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B28Y-RBZG] (estimating that average premiums in the indi-
vidual market will increase by 10% in 2019); Jonathan Keisling, 2019 ACA Mar-
ketplace Premiums, AM. ACTION F. (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.americanaction-
forum.org/research/2019-aca-marketplace-premiums/ [https://perma.cc/2D4Z 
-WRT3]. 
 102. Individual Markets Nationally Face High Premium Increases in Com-
ing Years Absent Federal or State Act, with Wide Variation Among States, COV-
ERED CAL. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://hbex.coveredca.com/data-research/library/ 
CoveredCA_High_Premium_Increases_3-8-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/889E 
-VH5T]. “Insurance premiums for Affordable Care Act health plans are likely to 
jump by 35 to 94 percent around the country within the next three years, ac-
cording to a new report concluding that recent federal decisions will have a pro-
found effect on prices.” Amy Goldstein, Premiums for ACA Health Insurance 




term=.762c0ff0c658. Note that these estimates are attributed to multiple legal 
and policy changes. The portion attributable to losing the mandate is expected 
to have the greatest impact.  
 103. Kelly Brantley & Chad Brooker, Double-Digit Premium Increases Ex-
pected in the Exchange Market in 2019, AVALERE (June 21, 2018), https:// 
avalere.com/press-releases/double-digit-premium-increases-expected-in-the 
-exchange-market-in-2019 [https://perma.cc/6GDC-TWPV]. 
 104. Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars, supra note 93. 
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Notably, premium increases are not just a negative conse-
quence for individuals. Premium increases, even in the private 
market, create a tremendous problem for the government. About 
87% of individuals who purchase policies on the Exchanges are 
receiving tax credits.105 As premiums go up, the federal govern-
ment is footing a larger and larger bill. 
Still, the story is also not as dire as once feared. There is also 
now wide agreement that the insurance markets are stable and 
will not collapse absent the mandate penalty.106 First, the pre-
mium subsidies and cost-sharing reduction payments will con-
tinue to ensure that silver plans are affordable for lower-income 
individuals. For those who make under 400% of the federal pov-
erty level who are eligible for subsidies, the federal government 
picks up a higher percentage of the bill as premiums go up, es-
sentially insulating those purchasers from premium increases. 
Eighty-seven percent of Exchange purchasers are eligible for 
these subsidies.107 As premiums increase, those who purchase 
policies on the Exchange and who are not eligible for subsidies 
are therefore more likely to drop coverage. But at least to a de-
gree, the existence of the subsidies and the cost-sharing reduc-
tion payments will mute the effect of the mandate penalty re-
peal. 
Second, the stickiness of insurance status means that some 
people who purchased insurance because of the mandate will 
maintain their coverage even when the mandate penalty is re-
pealed. That is, because of the status quo bias, people tend to 
leave things as they are.108 Some people who purchased policies 
because of the mandate will keep their coverage even after the 
 
 105. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., FIRST HALF OF 2018 AVERAGE EFFECTUATED ENROLLMENT DATA, at 3 
(2018), https://www.cms.gov/sites/default/files/2018-11/11-28-2018% 
20Effectuated%20Enrollment%20Table.pdf [https://perma.cc/C397-AQ6E]. 
 106. Brief for Bipartisan Economic Scholars, supra note 93, at 2–3. 
 107. Sara R. Collins & Munira Z. Gunja, Premium Tax Credits Are the Indi-
vidual Market’s Stabilizing Force, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2018/premium-tax-credits-are 
-individual-markets-stabilizing-force [https://perma.cc/WTM8-3Q2B]. See gen-
erally Steven Findlay, Health Insurance Costs Crushing Many People Who Don’t 
Get Federal Subsidies, KHN (Dec. 14, 2018), https://khn.org/news/health 
-insurance-costs-crushing-many-people-who-dont-get-federal-subsidies/ 
[https://perma.cc/2NN8-JZNG]. 
 108. See additional discussion of status quo bias infra Part III.B.1. 
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mandate is repealed. This is even more likely because of auto-
reenrollment. If an individual signed up for a policy on the Ex-
change, that individual is automatically re-enrolled each year 
unless she affirmatively opts out.109 Also, the fact that the man-
date still exists as a matter of law may encourage some people to 
continue to comply, even absent any penalty mechanism.110  
Third, there are other ACA mechanisms that encourage en-
rollment and will continue to positively impact insurance rates 
even in a post-mandate world. For instance, allowing children to 
stay on their parents’ plans until they turn twenty-six will mean 
that some young and healthy people will continue to be insured. 
And changes requiring that coverage be more comprehensive, in-
cluding that it cover essential health benefits, will encourage 
some to maintain their policies.  
Nonetheless, there is little question that uninsured num-
bers will rise and that premiums will as well. It is not a matter 
of whether these problems will manifest at all, it is just a matter 
of degree.111 
 
 109. Jennifer Bresnick, CMS Mulls End of Auto-Reenrollment, Silver Load-
ing in ACA Market, HEALTH PAYER INTELLIGENCE (Jan. 18, 2019), https:// 
healthpayerintelligence.com/news/cms-mulls-end-of-auto-reenrollment-silver 
-loading-in-aca-market [https://perma.cc/F53Q-Z8W6] (“Currently, any con-
sumer who does not notify his or her plan of any changes will have their existing 
coverage automatically renewed during the open enrollment period. Close to 
two million Americans were re-enrolled in their plans for 2019 coverage.”). CMS 
is presently seeking public comment on a plan to end the re-enrollment proce-
dure. See DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT; HHS NOTICE OF 
BENEFIT AND PAYMENT (2019) https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019 
-01-24/pdf/2019-00077.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTL9-RY3B]. 
 110. Propitious selection, where the risk averse over-insure, may be another 
stabilizing force on insurance markets. See, e.g., Tsvetanka Karagyozova & Pe-
ter Siegelman, Can Propitious Selection Stabilize Insurance Markets?, 35 J. INS. 
ISSUES 131 (2012). 
 111. Joseph R. Antos & James C. Capretta, CBO’s Revised View of Individ-
ual Mandate Reflected in Latest Forecast, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180605.966625/full/ [https:// 
perma.cc/UH26-CLRE] (citing CBO’s new forecast on number of uninsured after 
ACA repeal fell from thirteen million to only slightly more than eight million 
annually). But see Daniel W. Sacks et al., Does the Individual Mandate Affect 
Insurance Coverage? Evidence from the Population of Tax Returns, NAT’L BU-
REAU ECON. RES. https://conference.nber.org/conf_papers/f120008.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/W555-YJPY] (“[Y]oung people, men, and people without markers of 
serious health problems are all especially responsive.”). 
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D. THE BROADER PROBLEM OF UNINSUREDS 
The repeal of the individual mandate is not the only cause 
for concern when it comes to high rates of uninsured Americans. 
The uninsured problem has been pervasive in the U.S. system 
and even if the ACA still existed intact, with both the individual 
mandate and a 50-state Medicaid expansion, it would not have 
completely solved the problem.112  
High rates of uninsureds are problematic not just for the in-
dividual market-based reasons discussed in the prior Section. 
The uninsured also cause adverse spillover effects. And being 
uninsured leads to worse health outcomes for those individuals 
who face real difficulties in accessing care. 
1. The Adverse Spillover Effects 
Concern about premium increases is serious, but it is not the 
only negative market consequence of higher rates of uninsureds. 
While young and healthy individuals may assume that their 
health expenditures will be limited, the nature of health care 
spending is that it is unpredictable. 
Prior to the ACA, the problem of young invincibles who sud-
denly found themselves less than invincible was oft-discussed.113 
 
 112. It is worth mentioning that the original ACA not only contained an in-
dividual mandate penalty, but it also envisioned a fifty-state expansion of Med-
icaid. After NFIB v. Sebelius made Medicaid expansion optional, many individ-
uals who live in non-expansion states who would have obtained coverage 
through Medicaid became counted among the uninsured. See 567 U.S. 519, 545–
55 (2012). Nonetheless, the ACA was never a model for universal coverage and 
always required individuals to make the decision to enroll in an insurance pol-
icy.  
 113. See Munira Z. Gunja et al., Young Adults Will Be Among the Last-Mi-
nute ACA Enrollees This Week: How Have the Coverage Expansions Affected 
Them?, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Dec. 12, 2017) https://www 
.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2017/young-adults-will-be-among-last-minute 
-aca-enrollees-week-how-have-coverage-expansions [https://perma.cc/9P26 
-G6GQ]; Erin Hemlin, What’s Happened to Millennials Since the ACA? Unprec-
edented Coverage & Improved Access to Benefits, YOUNG INVINCIBLES (Apr. 
2017), http://younginvincibles.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/YI-Health-Care 
-Brief-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/33K7-DXS7]; Bisundev Mahato et al., Rite of 
Passage? Why Young Adults Become Uninsured and How New Policies Can 
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These stories are often tragic—the twenty-seven-year-old who is 
in a serious car accident or the thirty-year-old unexpectedly di-
agnosed with cancer. These individuals who lack insurance fre-
quently wait to seek care until they are very ill, at which point 
care is more expensive.114 Many present in emergency rooms and 
consume care at a high cost that they cannot afford to pay. These 
costs are ultimately born by the insured population and the gov-
ernment.115 They are negative externalities not internalized by 
the uninsured, but by the system more generally. As uninsured 
rates increase, these adverse spillover effects increase as well.116  
2. The Health Risk of Being Uninsured 
High rates of uninsurance is also concerning because it is 
tied to increased difficulties accessing quality health care.117 In 
many studies, including a seminal one conducted by the Insti-
 
 114. See Margot Sanger-Katz, Getting Sick Can Be Really Expensive, Even 
for the Insured, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
03/21/upshot/getting-sick-is-really-expensive.html; Anna Wilde Mathews & 
Louise Radnofsky, Health Care’s Bipartisan Problem: The Sick Are Expensive 
and Someone Has to Pay, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/health-cares-bipartisan-problem-the-sick-are-expensive-and-someone 
-has-to-pay-1484234963. 
 115. Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, How Much Do Health Insurance Subsidies 
Cost Taxpayers?, INS. J. (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www.insurancejournal.com/ 
news/national/2016/12/19/435878.htm [https://perma.cc/VA3M-2KFL]; 
Maureen Groppe, Who Pays When Someone Without Insurance Shows Up in the 
ER?, USA TODAY (July 3, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
politics/2017/07/03/who-pays-when-someone-without-insurance-shows-up-er/ 
445756001/ [https://perma.cc/XZ2N-549H].  
 116. See How ACA Repeal and Replace Proposals Could Affect Coverage and 
Premiums for Older Adults and Have Spillover Effects for Medicare, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (June 5, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/how 
-aca-repeal-and-replace-proposals-could-affect-coverage-and-premiums-for 
-older-adults-and-have-spillover-effects-for-medicare/ [https://perma.cc/ZYH7 
-7PZ6]; Julie Rovner, An Increase in the Uninsured Could Impact the Insured, 
Too, GOVERNING (July 17, 2017), http://www.governing.com/topics/health 
-human-services/khn-uninsured-insured-spillover.html [https://perma.cc/  
E9HR-RYWM]. 
 117. See Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Concep-
tual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1873, 1890 (2011) (describing the “Health Promotion” model of health in-
surance). 
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tute of Medicine, uninsured individuals have been found to ex-
perience worse health outcomes.118 The reasons might be obvi-
ous. Uninsured patients often cannot access medical care outside 
of an emergency room.119 And even then, emergency depart-
ments are not required to treat uninsured patients unless they 
are having a medical emergency.120 Uninsured individuals re-
ceive less preventive care, and even if they can access care, they 
often delay it until their health condition has worsened.121 In 
general, uninsured patients have more unmet health needs.122 
Even Medicaid, which is often criticized for offering a lower qual-
ity of care than private insurance or Medicare, is connected with 
significantly improved health outcomes when compared to hav-
ing no insurance at all.123 
 
 118. INST. OF MED., AMERICA’S UNINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR 
HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE 116 (2009); Erin Schumaker, 7 Things That Will 
Happen if 14 Million More People Are Uninsured Next Year, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 30, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/health-care-bill-consequences 
-2018_n_592d92f5e4b0065b20b873b7 [https://perma.cc/KQ8C-8VCB] . 
 119. See David Doyle, Emergency Rooms Continue to Serve as Patients’ Pri-
mary-care Provider, MOD. MED. (Mar. 8, 2013), https://www.physicianspractice 
.com/blog/emergency-rooms-continue-serve-patients-primary-care-provider 
[https://perma.cc/5FZC-8VES]; Nearly Half of US Medical Care Comes from 
Emergency Rooms, SCI. DAILY (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.sciencedaily.com/ 
releases/2017/10/171017091849.htm [https://perma.cc/LA44-P6P5]; Elizabeth 
Pratt, Why Do So Many People Still Go to the Emergency Room?, HEALTHLINE 
(Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.healthline.com/health-news/medical-care-in 
-emergency-rooms#4 [https://perma.cc/CC3G-WKXS].  
 120. Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd (2011). 
 121. See Lydia Saad, Delaying Care a Healthcare Strategy for Three in 10 
Americans, GALLUP (Dec. 17, 2018), https://news.gallup.com/poll/245486/ 
delaying-care-healthcare-strategy-three-americans.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/NU86-LXXY]. 
 122. Lynn M. Olson et al., Children in the United States with Discontinuous 
Health Insurance Coverage, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 382, 382 (2005). 
 123. A recent large-scale, randomized, controlled trial suggested that being 
on Medicaid increases health care use, reduces financial strain, and substan-
tially improves self-reported health relative to being uninsured. Katherine Bi-
acker & Amy Finkelstein, The Effects of Medicaid Coverage—Learning from the 
Oregon Experiment, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 683, 684 (2011); see also Amy Finkel-
stein et al., The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First 
Year (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17190, 2011), 
https://doi.org/papers/w17190.pdf [https://perma.cc/94NS-7S5G]. Some studies, 
however, have found that access to health insurance most improves mental and 
financial well-being, but not necessarily physical health. 
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If nothing is done to address the increase in the uninsured 
population, we can expect to see health outcomes worsen.124 
III.  DETERRENTS TO HEALTH INSURANCE PURCHASE: 
THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ITS 
LIMITATIONS   
To address the uninsured problem and mitigate the negative 
repercussions of the mandate penalty repeal, it is imperative to 
examine alternate ways to prompt individuals, and particularly 
healthy individuals, to purchase insurance.125 But designing and 
evaluating alternatives first requires a better understanding of 
the impediments to enrollment.126  
This Part explores the neoclassical economic deterrents to 
enrollment—why it is in the rational self-interest of some not to 
enroll. But it also describes the limits of economic theory in ex-
plaining individual decision-making. It surveys some of the rel-
evant findings of behavioral economics, which provides a long 
list of reasons that people do not purchase health insurance pol-
icies even if it would be in their rational self-interest to do so.  
 
 124. This Part highlights just some of the negative implications of repeal of 
the mandate. There are certain to be others. Consider, for instance, the likely 
reduction in jobs and economic growth that the repeal will cause. See JOSH 
BIVENS, ECON. POL’Y INST., REPEALING THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT WOULD 
COST JOBS IN EVERY STATE, 1 (2017). 
 125. This Part assumes that universal health care in the form of “Medicare 
for All” or a similar plan will not be implemented in the short-term. Even the 
most optimistic proponents of such plans envision a lengthy period of transition 
during which the problem of uninsureds will still need to be addressed. 
 126. There are other entirely different schemes that may mitigate the reper-
cussions of the repeal of the mandate, but this article assumes that major 
changes to current law, while possible, are not likely to be imminent. Sara R. 
Collins et al., A Roadmap to Health Insurance for All: Principles for Reform, 
COMMONWEALTH FUND (2007), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/ 
default/files/documents/___media_files_publications_fund_report_2007_oct_ 
a_roadmap_to_health_insurance_for_all__principles_for_reform_collins_ 
roadmaphltinsforall_1066_pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/UXL4-8B39]. States are 
also passing state-level mandates. Dana Palanker et al., State Efforts to Pass 
Individual Mandate Requirements Aim to Stabilize Markets and Protect Con-
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A. NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
In a recent survey of uninsured nonelderly adults that que-
ried why individuals lacked health insurance, the most popular 
answer was: “cost is too high.”127 Although the survey did not 
further parse this response, the cost deterrent likely means ei-
ther one of two things: (1) premiums are unaffordable or (2) in-
dividuals have made a calculation that the cost of a policy is too 
high relative to the predicted benefit.  
First, there is strong evidence that many individuals quite 
simply cannot afford health insurance premiums.128 They are 
faced with choices like paying for housing, paying down loans, or 
buying health insurance. And they choose—although arguably it 
is hardly a choice—not to purchase insurance. Those who cannot 
afford premiums are more likely to be young. Just as an example, 
on the individual market, an average “silver” plan in Cheyenne, 
Wyoming costs $9,600 in premiums per year.129 In Richmond, 
Virginia, it is $6,000 per year.130 While the ACA tax subsidies 
help make insurance more affordable for many Americans,131 
costs can still be prohibitive. This is particularly the case for in-
dividuals who fall into the “coverage gap” because their states 
chose not to expand Medicaid.132  
The coverage gap occurs because the ACA was drafted to 
provide all individuals living below 138% of the federal poverty 
 
 127. See supra note 11; see also supra note 4 (citing a poll taken by 45% of 
the population). 
 128. The costs given are approximated. They are derived by taking the “Sec-
ond Lowest Silver Cost Plan” for 2019 and multiplying by twelve for the year 
for the respective cities. Katherine Baicker et al., Health Insurance Coverage 
and Take-Up: Lessons from Behavioral Economics, 90 MILBANK Q. 107, 110 
(2012), (“The evidence suggests that the principal problem is affordability.”). 
 129. Rabal Kamal et al., 2019 Premium Changes on ACA Exchanges, KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/ 
tracking-2019-premium-changes-on-aca-exchanges/ [https://perma.cc/3P6Y-
XELJ]. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Elizabeth Davis, How the ACA Health Insurance Subsidy Works, 
VERYWELL HEALTH (Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.verywellhealth.com/how-the 
-health-insurance-subsidy-works-1738915 [https://perma.cc/D5ZD-4LT7]. 
 132. Rachel Garfield et al., The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in 
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level with access to Medicaid.133 Therefore, it only provides sub-
sidies for those making between 138% and 400% of the federal 
poverty level. Individuals who make below 138% of the federal 
poverty level, and who do not qualify for Medicaid, do not have 
access to subsidies.134 Indeed, many people who live in non-ex-
pansion states and make below 138% of the federal poverty level 
do not have access to Medicaid.135 Most state Medicaid plans do 
not cover healthy adults at all, and for those that do, coverage 
generally only applies for individuals who make far less than 
138% of the federal poverty level.136 The vast majority of these 
coverage gap individuals cannot afford to buy a health insurance 
policy and still pay for necessities like food and shelter. Perhaps 
it is unsurprising that around two-thirds of the uninsured make 
a below-median income.137  
Not all of the respondents who cite cost concerns as the rea-
son to not purchase insurance truly cannot afford it. They none-
theless view cost as the primary deterrent to purchasing a policy 
because the cost is too high relative to their expected benefit 
from the policy. This reason is particularly salient for the popu-
lation insurers most desire to enroll—the young and healthy.138  
The classical assumptions of traditional economic theory are 
that rational individuals will make choices in their own self-in-
terests, seeking to maximize their own utility or the satisfaction 
that they derive from an outcome.139 There are significant limits 
to applying traditional economic theory in health care, discussed 
in more detail below. And yet as a starting point, it can help to 
explain when individuals will choose to buy health insurance 
and when they will forego it.  
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POV-
ERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 26 
(2011).  
 138. Consider, as well, that young people of limited benefits might become 
Medicaid-eligible if they get sick. And they can always access emergency de-
partment care in the case of a true emergency. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd 
(although EMTALA does not forgive the duty to pay for care). 
 139. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL 
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 343 (1974). 
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Health insurance is a mechanism for spreading financial 
risk in the face of uncertainty.140 An individual deciding whether 
or not to buy insurance does not know what health costs he or 
she will incur during the term of a policy. Indeed, if one could 
easily calculate that insurance would cost $6,000 in premiums 
in a year, but that the individual would incur $15,000 in health 
care costs, that person would buy the insurance policy every 
time. Or on the flip side, if a policy costs $6,000 in premiums, 
and an individual knew that she would only incur $1,000 in out-
of-pocket costs absent a policy, that individual would never buy 
the policy.141  
Some individuals do know with a greater degree of certainty 
what their health care costs will look like than others. For in-
stance, patients who suffer from chronic conditions may know 
with higher certainty that their health costs will be high. But a 
currently healthy middle-age person might have a very hard 
time predicting her health costs. For the most part, all one can 
usually do is estimate the likelihood of various states of health 
and the attendant costs. Insurance exists precisely because an 
individual cannot know with certainty what his or her costs will 
be.  
Further complicating matters, individuals have different de-
grees of risk tolerance. A risk-averse person might choose to pay 
$6,000 in premiums even if there is a high likelihood that her 
health costs will be less, while an individual with a higher risk 
 
 140. See AARP PUB. POLICY INST., BEYOND AGE RATING: SPREADING RISK IN 
HEALTH INSURANCE MARKETS (2009), https://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/ppi/ 
health-care/i35-age-rating.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3B9-JXZ9]; Douglas M. Mac-
Intyre, Risk Selection, Risk Sharing, and Policy, in EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH 
BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK 167, 200 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold T. 
Shapiro eds., 1993). 
 141. And these examples ignore the transaction costs in enrollment, which 
also figure into an individual’s decision. See supra note 128, at 111. There is a 
cost associated with researching, applying for, and dealing with the general ad-
ministration of having a health plan. Transaction costs may further impact in-
surance enrollment decisions. See, e.g., KETCHUM & LAKE RES. PARTNERS, IN-
FORMING CHIP AND MEDICAID OUTREACH AND EDUCATION, CMS REPORT 
(2011); JENNIFER P. STUBER ET AL., GEO. WASH. U. MED. CTR., BEYOND STIGMA: 
WHAT BARRIERS ACTUALLY AFFECT THE DECISIONS OF LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 
TO ENROLL IN MEDICAID? (2000), https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_ 
policy_briefs/53 [https://perma.cc/AF6X-8M7J]. 
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tolerance might choose to forego insurance in an otherwise iden-
tical scenario.142  
In general, though, economic theory suggests that when 
there are several possible outcomes, and the chance of those out-
comes varies, an individual’s decision can be modeled using the 
expected utility model of choice under risk.143 Under expected 
utility theory, an individual determines her utility for each pos-
sible outcome and then weights those outcomes by the likelihood 
that the outcome will occur. An individual will then select the 
choice with the highest weighted utility, subject to risk toler-
ance.144 
The next Section will discuss why individuals are imperfect 
at these calculations. There is much they do not understand in 
the technical world of health insurance and they often make 
choices that are against their own stated preferences.145 But for 
purposes of standard economic theory, the role of prices and in-
formation in determining coverage is paramount.146 And at least 
some individuals do seem to decide whether or not to purchase 
 
 142. See generally Matthew Rabin, Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility The-
ory: A Calibration Theorem, 68 ECONOMETRICA 1281 (2000). 
 143. Bob Clemen, Assessing Risk Tolerance, 23 DECISION ANALYSIS 4, 4 
(2004); James Chen, Expected Utility, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 26, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/expectedutility.asp [https://perma.cc/ 
UEM7-L27V]. 
 144. Nathan Berg & Gerd Gigerenzer, As-If Behavioral Economics: Neoclas-
sical Economics in Disguise?, (Munich Personal RepEc Archive, Paper No. 
26586, 2010), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/26586/1/MPRA_paper_26586 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/C8RD-PVAF]; see also Clemen, supra note 143. Expected 
utility theory is an account of how to choose rationally when you are not sure 
which outcome will result from your acts. Its basic slogan is: choose the act with 
the highest expected utility. M. SUSAN MARQUIS & MARTIN R. HOLMER, RAND, 
CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND THE DEMAND FOR HEALTH INSURANCE 
(1986), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/notes/2007/N2516.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SVC3-DVVU]; Ray Briggs, Normative Theories of Rational 
Choice: Expected Utility, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Aug. 8, 2014), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationality-normative-utility/ [https://perma 
.cc/P3H8-Z2CL].  
 145. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 16 (summarizing the large body of liter-
ature suggesting that patients do not act as neoclassical economics would pre-
dict). 
 146. See Maximiliane Hoerl et al., Knowledge as a Predictor of Insurance 
Coverage Under the Affordable Care Act, 55 MED. CARE 428, 430 (2017); 
Knowledge About Health Insurance and Finance Linked to Higher Rates of 
Health Coverage, RAND (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.rand.org/news/press/ 
2016/11/17/index1.html [https://perma.cc/NTW8-LRQD]. 
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health insurance based on a straightforward economic analy-
sis.147  
A young healthy person calculating her weighted expected 
utility subject to risk tolerance may very well make the rational 
decision to not purchase insurance. This is particularly likely as 
premiums increase relative to a young person’s relatively low ex-
pected health costs.148 While society may have an interest in us-
ing insurance as a mechanism to redistribute income to sicker or 
poorer populations, it is not in the self-interest of individuals to 
subsidize the care of others.149 Historically, when private goals 
have differed from broader social goals (like the desire for people 
to be insured), purchases have been made more attractive 
through various means. Part IV will suggest some ways to com-
bat the cost objection to policy purchase. But first, the next Sec-
tion explores reasons other than cost that individuals might 
choose not to purchase insurance, even when it might be in their 
rational self-interest to enroll.  
B. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
Standard economic theory assumes that rational individu-
als make perfect decisions in their own self-interests, but in-
sights from behavioral economics explain that people are only 
boundedly rational and self-interested.150 
 
 147. See, e.g., David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-
Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 26 (2001) 
(“[T]he evidence is fairly clear that potential subscribers approach coverage de-
cisions in traditional economic terms.”). 
 148. “According to the U.S. Census, 55 percent of Americans without health 
insurance are under the age of 35. 72 percent are under the age of 45. It’s these 
generally healthy people, in the first halves of their lives, who elect to go without 
insurance, because it is far too expensive, relative to their current health sta-
tus.” Avik Roy, Putting the ‘Insurance’ Back in Health Insurance, Forbes (May 
21, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2012/05/21/putting-the 
-insurance-back-in-health-insurance/#4143f9e86a4a [https://perma.cc/P6WU 
-EYB4]. 
 149. Of course, this is why the ACA included the individual mandate in the 
first place. Other mechanisms have also been used to try to make insurance 
purchase more financially attractive, including the use of tax incentives and 
employer subsidizing of costs. HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., INSURANCE AND 
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE MOST MISUNDER-
STOOD INDUSTRY 4 (2013). 
 150. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Sci-
ence: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. 
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Numerous studies confirm that people have difficulty mak-
ing the kinds of perfect decisions envisioned by neoclassical eco-
nomics.151 In many ways, health insurance is the poster child for 
behavioral economics because, as many have demonstrated, peo-
ple are particularly likely to make poor decisions when it comes 
to matters of both health insurance and health care more 
broadly.152 They do not really understand the choices and 
tradeoffs they are being asked to make in deciding between 
health plan options.153 Principle-agent problems pervade the 
process because others (including employers) strongly influence 
the choices they are given.154 Consumers lack the stable prefer-
ences that the law assumes they will draw upon in making deci-
sions, and they suffer from a number of systematic decision-mak-
ing biases.155 “Difficulties are particularly likely when 
individuals are faced with decisions that involve uncertainty, 
tradeoffs between current and future costs and benefits, or sig-
nificant complexity”156—all of which apply to the health insur-
ance scenario. 
 
L. REV. 1051, 1054–55 (2000); Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction to BEHAVIORAL 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). See generally HERBERT A. 
SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL (1957) (containing mathemati-
cal essays on societal effects and rational human behavior). 
 151. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, THE FRAMING OF DECISIONS 
AND THE RATIONALITY OF CHOICE (1980) [hereinafter KAHNEMAN & TVERSKY, 
FRAMING OF DECISIONS]; see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979) 
[hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory]. See generally Herbert A. 
Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON 99 (1955) (discuss-
ing “an ‘economic man,’ who, in the course of being ‘economic’ is also ‘rational’”). 
 152. See, e.g., Jeffrey Liebman & Richard Zeckhauser, Simple Humans, 
Complex Insurance, Subtle Subsidies, in USING TAXES TO REFORM HEALTH IN-
SURANCE: PITFALLS AND PROMISES 230, 232 (Henry J. Aaron & Leonard E. Bur-
man eds., 2008); see also Barak D. Richman, Behavioral Economics and Health 
Policy: Understanding Medicaid’s Failure, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 705, 719–22 
(2005).  
 153. See Hoffman, supra note 16. 
 154. Id.  
 155. Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. 
REV. 1255 (2017). 
 156. Lessons for Health Care from Behavioral Economics, NBER (Oct. 7, 
2019), https://www.nber.org/aginghealth/2008no4/w14330.html [https://perma 
.cc/8RLA-MZZR]; see Baicker et al., supra note 128, at 8 (“But while prices and 
information are undeniably key factors for understanding and achieving socially 
optimal health insurance coverage, they alone seem insufficient to explain ob-
served patterns of coverage. There is mounting evidence that a third factor, the 
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There is strong evidence that people turn down policies even 
when they are affordable157 and even when the expected utility 
model of choice under risk suggests that individuals should pur-
chase policies.158 For instance, many people do not sign up for 
Medicaid or other public benefits even if it would be virtually 
free to enroll.159 Likewise, many people with access to subsidies 
that cover almost the entire price of the policy still do not sign 
up for a plan.160  
So while prices and information are undeniably key factors 
in understanding insurance uptake, this Section explores vari-
ous other reasons that individuals choose not to purchase insur-
ance.  
 
psychology of individual decision making, plays a central role in driving cover-
age outcomes.”).  
 157. Baicker et al., supra note 128, at 113 (“Evidence suggests that the poli-
cies available are in fact affordable to many who turn them down, with esti-
mates suggesting that policies are affordable to between 25 and 75 percent of 
the uninsured . . . . Even among households with incomes of $75,000 or more, 8 
percent of individuals are uninsured, and these people represent nearly 20 per-
cent of the uninsured.”); see also M. Kate Bundorf & Mark V. Pauly, Is Health 
Insurance Affordable for the Uninsured? 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 650 (2006) (inves-
tigating the meaning of affordability in the context of health insurance); Helen 
Levy & Thomas DeLeire, What Do People Buy When They Don’t Buy Health 
Insurance and What Does That Say About Why They are Uninsured? 45 INQUIRY 
365 (2008) (comparing “household spending on different goods by insured versus 
uninsured households”). See generally DeNavas-Walt et al., supra note 137 (pre-
senting data on income poverty, and health insurance coverage in the United 
States).  
 158. See Eric J. Johnson et al., Can Consumers Make Affordable Care Af-
fordable? The Value of Choice Architecture, 8 PLOS ONE e81521 (2013) (finding 
that consumers chose the objectively better plan only half the time). 
 159. See, e.g., Baicker et al., supra note 128, at 110  (“[O]f the nearly 7 million 
children lacking health insurance, approximately 65 percent are estimated to 
be eligible for Medicaid, CHIP, or both.”(citing GENEVIEVE M. KENNEY ET AL., 
GAINS FOR CHILDREN: INCREASED PARTICIPATION IN MEDICAID AND CHIP IN 
2009 (2011))). 
 160. See Rachel Fehr et al., How Many of the Uninsured Can Purchase a 
Marketplace Plan for Free?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www 
.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/how-many-of-the-uninsured-can-purchase-a 
-marketplace-plan-for-free/ [https://perma.cc/W7AC-9FHJ]. The Medicaid 
anomaly might be explained by a philosophical protest to public benefits, but 
that seems less likely to be a rationale for refusing private, subsidized insur-
ance.  
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1. Status Quo Bias 
The status quo bias refers to the fact that people often prefer 
to leave things as they are—in other words, to stick with the sta-
tus quo.161 This bias has been demonstrated by extensive exper-
imentation.162 Perhaps the most famous example of the status 
quo bias, or inertia bias as it is sometimes called, concerns rates 
of organ donation, where rates vary tremendously between opt-
in and opt-out regimes.163 A difference in preferences does not 
explain the disparity. Rather, people just tend to stick with the 
default or to maintain the decision that has already been 
made.164 Similar results have been confirmed in other contexts, 
 
 161. Epstein, supra note 155, at 1294 (citing Eric J. Johnson & Daniel Gold-
stein, Do Defaults Save Lives?, 302 SCI. 1338, 1339 (2003)); see also Omri Ben-
Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 651, 655 (2006) (reviewing the literature finding that individuals are 
biased to “stick” with the status quo). 
 162. See, e.g., Katrin Burmeister & Christian Schade, Are Entrepreneurs’ De-
cisions More Biased? An Experimental Investigation of the Susceptibility to Sta-
tus Quo Bias, 22 J. BUS. VENTURING 340 (2007) (finding “a status quo bias when 
investigating why pregnant women prefer the care they receive compared to 
other methods of care”); Raymond S. Hartman et al., Consumer Rationality and 
the Status Quo, 106 Q.J. ECON. 141 (1991) (finding electric power consumers to 
be status quo biased by studying decision behavior); Eric J. Johnson et al., 
Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RISK & UNCER-
TAINTY 35 (1993) (studying the status quo manipulations on the choice of an 
insurance policy); Maureen Porter & Sally Macintyre, What Is, Must Be Best: A 
Research Note on Conservative Or Deferential Responses to Antenatal Care Pro-
vision, 19 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1197 (1984); Mercé Roca et al., Ambiguity Seeking 
As a Result of the Status Quo Bias, 32 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 175 (finding the 
status quo bias might even reduce most individuals’ aversion to ambiguity when 
the ambiguous option is the status quo); William Samuelson & Richard Zeck-
hauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). 
 163. See Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 161; see also Richard H. Thaler, 
Opting in vs. Opting Out, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2009), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html [https://perma.cc/UE2F-SV4C]. 
 164. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 162, at 8. 
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including enrollment in retirement plans165 and the choice to use 
green energy.166 
There are various hypotheses about what drives the status 
quo bias. It might be laziness or an opposition to change.167 Or 
people might defer to the policymaker who chose the default in 
the first place.168 
As to health insurance, the default is generally not to have 
a policy.169 Individuals have to go to quite a lot of effort to sign 
up—obtain information on policies, compare the options, deal 
with the administrative hurdles of actually applying, and so 
forth.170 These burdens are disproportionately high for those liv-
ing in poverty for whom the time and effort required to access 
health insurance can truly be an impediment.171 In general, the 
 
 165. John Beshears et al., Public Policy and Saving for Retirement: The Au-
tosave Features of the Pension Protection Act of 2006, in BETTER LIVING 
THROUGH ECONOMICS 274, 287 (John J. Siegfried ed., 2010) (finding clear evi-
dence that automatic enrollment increased savings and financial well-being); 
Alexander Kempf & Stefan Ruenzi, Status Quo Bias and the Number of Alter-
natives: An Empirical Illustration from the Mutual Fund Industry, 7 J. BEHAV. 
FIN. 204 (2006); see also, e.g., Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power 
of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior (Nat’l Bu-
reau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 7682, 2000), https://doi.org/10.3386/ 
w7682 [https://perma.cc/EJ5C-D945] (finding that employers’ retirement sav-
ings plan defaults shape employees’ enrollment decisions).  
 166. Daniel Pichert & Konstantinos V. Katsikopoulos, Green Defaults: Infor-
mation Presentation and Pro-Environmental Behaviour, 28 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 
63, 67–69 (2008) (discussing the results of a study offering participants the 
choice between two suppliers—one default, the other alternative—which 
showed sixty-eight percent of participants chose the default supplier). 
 167. See Dylan Walsh, The Power of Doing Nothing, STAN. BUS. (Jan. 22, 
2018), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/power-doing-nothing [https:// 
perma.cc/P7QV-TJJA]; see also Baraka Kambi, Status Quo Bias: Is it Human 
Habit to Prefer the Current Situation and Abhor Changes?, 4 RES. HUMAN & 
SOC. SCI. 1, 3 (2014). 
 168. See JASON CAMPBELL ET AL., SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, MODELING OF POLI-
CYHOLDER BEHAVIOR FOR LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY PRODUCTS, (2014).  
 169. But see supra Part II.D (discussing re-enrollment on the Exchange). 
 170. See, e.g., Ways to Apply For 2019 Health Insurance, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/apply-and-enroll/how-to-apply/ [https://perma.cc/ 
W6AZ-FNM4]. 
 171. Shanoor Seervai, It’s Harder for People Living in Poverty to Get Health 
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status quo bias suggests that some people might not sign up for 
insurance because not having insurance is the default choice.172 
The status quo bias has been shown to be stronger in certain 
contexts,173 but studies have confirmed the existence of the sta-
tus quo bias in health insurance.174 The high coverage rate for 
employer-sponsored insurance has been explained, in part, by a 
preference for the status quo.175 The choice of the default is 
therefore very important to decision-making.176  
2. Misperception of Risk and Optimism Bias 
Individuals make systematic mistakes in evaluating proba-
bilities and assessing the true risk of an outcome.177 These diffi-
culties with probabilities likely impact health insurance pur-
chase decisions.178 Individuals tend to give too much weight to 
events that are unlikely to occur (like a plane crash) and too little 
weight to high probability outcomes.179 And people tend to be 
overly optimistic when it comes to their assessment of risk.180 
 
 172. Skinner & Volpp, supra note 97 (discussing the inertia bias in health 
care). 
 173. See Samuelson & Zeckhauser, supra note 162 (finding the more options 
that were included in the choice set, the stronger the relative bias for the status 
quo based on the survey results). 
 174. Id.; Benjamin R. Handel, Adverse Selection and Switching Costs in 
Health Insurance Markets: When Nudging Hurts (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., 
Working Paper No. 17459, 2011), https://doi.org/10.3386/w17459 [https://perma 
.cc/29CS-DVEW]. 
 175. Baicker et al., supra note 128, at 119 (“[T]he relatively high coverage 
rates for employer-sponsored insurance are likely due in part to such factors.”). 
 176. Id. (“[T]he main consequence for take-up is to reinforce the power of the 
institutional features that determine the status quo.”). 
 177. Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 152, at 4–5. 
 178. Johnson et al., supra note 162, at 36; Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra 
note 152, at 4–5. 
 179. Kahneman & Tversky, Prospect Theory, supra note 151, at 286. These 
may point in different directions for insurance decisions. Concern over low-prob-
ability events may cause over-insurance, whereas too little concern over high-
probability ones may result in under-insurance. The latter seems likely to be 
more pervasive. Susan K. Laury et al., Insurance Decisions for Low-Probability 
Losses, 39 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17 (2009). 
 180. See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 15, at 79 (describing the operation 
of the optimism bias in the same context); see also Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic 
Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 
(1980) (explaining that people discount the likelihood of adverse outcomes). 
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For instance, people believe that they are less likely to be af-
fected than their peers by poor health outcomes from asthma, 
drug addiction, and lung cancer, even when it is not true.181 This 
phenomenon is referred to as the optimism bias.182 
A related bias is the illusion of control bias—people believe 
they have more control over outcomes than they do in reality.183 
Consider the individual who believes she will not need to access 
the health care system because she eats healthy and exercises 
regularly. She may be overly optimistic about her chances of 
staying in good health, particularly when there is a significant 
degree of chance involved.  
While many young and healthy people might be making wel-
fare-enhancing decisions in not purchasing insurance, many ac-
tually would be better off with insurance, but choose not to pur-
chase it because they are overly optimistic about their prospects 
of staying healthy. According to the U.S. Census, fifty-five per-
cent of Americans without health insurance are under the age of 
thirty-five.184 Many may be overly optimistic about their pro-
spects of staying healthy and not needing insurance. Young peo-
ple may believe that by paying premiums, they are really just 
throwing away money because there is such a small likelihood 
that they will need it—even if that is not an accurate assessment 
of their risk.185 
 
 181. See Derek E. Bambauer, Shopping Badly: Cognitive Biases, Communi-
cations, and the Fallacy of the Marketplace of Ideas, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 649, 
709 (2006). 
 182. See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 15, at 468–69 (surveying evidence 
that young people in particular do not purchase health insurance because of 
optimism bias, resulting in the moniker “young invincibles”). 
 183. How the Illusion of Control Bias Impacts Investing, HIT INVESTMENTS, 
https://www.hitinvestments.com/illusion-of-control/ [https://perma.cc/PF5P 
-5U74]. Ramon Salinas, There’s a Reason Why You Have Coverage and Your 
Buddy Doesn’t: Cognitive Bias and the Insurance Market, FIN. SERV. (Apr. 16, 
2018), https://www.continuuminnovation.com/en/how-we-think/article/theres-a 
-reason-why-you-have-coverage-and-your-buddy-doesnt [https://perma.cc/V3LA 
-FNGZ] (“Probably the most predominant of optimistic biases is a misguided 
tendency to overestimate one’s capacity to influence the outcome of certain 
events.”). 
 184. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 12. 
 185. Another related bias is the anecdotal fallacy. People give greater weight 
to their knowledge of isolated examples, particularly when those examples are 
negative. Stories of insurers not paying claims despite individuals having paid 
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3. Hyperbolic Discounting and Regret Bias 
Time-inconsistent preferences also likely affect insurance 
decision-making. Hyperbolic discounting refers to the tendency 
for people to choose immediate gratification over longer-term 
benefits, even when the longer-term benefits will be greater.186 
Young people are particularly susceptible to this bias.187 Indeed, 
it is a common problem when it comes to prompting individuals 
to receive preventive health care, which requires some inconven-
ience and possibly pain or discomfort in the near-term in ex-
change for the prospect of avoiding an illness that one may or 
may not develop in the future.188 Regret-aversion bias refers to 
the related concern that people fear that they will later regret a 
decision that they make in the present.189 People therefore tend 
to avoid making decisions.190 
The nature of insurance requires people to part with their 
money now based on the prospect that they might incur health 
care expenses later. Parting with premiums in the present is 
more painful than having to pay health care costs later. When 
 
premiums, for instance, are rare. But an individual who gives that story dispro-
portionate weight because of their personal knowledge of it might choose not to 
purchase insurance for that reason. 
 186. David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. 
ECON. 443 (1997); see Baicker et al., supra note 128, at 117 (“People sometimes 
postpone activities with immediate costs and tend to give too much weight to 
losses and gains in the present versus similar losses and gains in the future. 
This type of present-biased preference implies that people will delay incurring 
costs even if doing so will reduce their welfare in the long run.”). 
 187. See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE 93–94 (1992); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205, 
252 (2004). 
 188. Ateev Mehrotra et al., Impact of a Patient Incentive Program on Receipt 
of Preventive Care, 20 AM. J. MANAGED CARE 494, 495 (2014) (“When making 
the choice to receive preventive care, patients balance the inconvenience of re-
ceiving preventive care with distant and often intangible benefits. Humans gen-
erally discount such future benefits and therefore it may not be surprising that 
many patients do not seek preventive care.”). 
 189. See The Behavioral Biases of Individuals, FIN. STROKES, http://www 
.financestrokes.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/The-Behavioral-Biases-of 
-Individuals.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4XB-827L] (“Regret-aversion bias is an emo-
tional bias in which people tend to avoid making decisions that will result in 
action out of fear that the decision will turn out poorly.”); see also Nafez Al Tarik, 
Regret Aversion Bias, PROF. FIN. STUD., https://www.pfsbd.net/regret-aversion 
-bias/ [https://perma.cc/546U-6UUH]. 
 190. See The Behavioral Biases of Individuals, supra note 189. 
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this is coupled with the fact that consumers will avoid making a 
choice if they fear it will be a bad one, individuals may choose 
not to purchase insurance even if it would be in their rational 
self-interest to do so. Individuals’ underweighting of future ben-
efits is an important component of insurance decision-making.191 
4. Framing Effect 
The decision about whether or not to buy insurance may also 
be subject to the framing effect. While traditional economic the-
ory assumes that people have stable preferences and make deci-
sions with reference to those preferences, studies have shown 
that individual preferences may indeed not be stable.192 Rather, 
results differ when identical decision choices are simply framed 
differently. 
For instance, in a famous study, Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman offered participants two identical choices.193 But they 
framed one choice as saving 200 lives (out of 600 lives) and the 
other as allowing 400 people to die.194 Seventy-two percent of 
people chose the option that was framed in the positive (saving 
200 lives) while only fifty percent of people made the same choice 
with the negative framing (400 people will die).195 
Consideration might be given to how the choice to purchase 
an insurance policy is framed and what effect that frame might 
have on individual decision-making. In fact, the framing of the 
individual mandate as a penalty—people must purchase insur-
ance to avoid a penalty—conjures a negative framing.196 This 
framing might have impacted take-up of insurance even when 
the mandate was in effect. 
 
 191. This bias is also sometimes referred to as “present bias.” Jason Abaluck 
& Jonathan Gruber, Choice Inconsistencies Among the Elderly: Evidence from 
Plan Choice in the Medicare Part D Program, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 1180 (2011). 
 192. See generally KAHNEMAN & TVERSKY, FRAMING OF DECISIONS, supra 
note 151.  
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 3–4. 
 195. Id. 
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5. Choice Overload and Complexity 
Finally, while it was traditionally assumed that more 
choices were always preferable to fewer ones, studies have now 
shown that individuals actually suffer from choice overload.197 
That is, when too many choices are offered, individuals will be-
come overwhelmed and will refrain from making the choice at 
all.198  
Again, the retirement plan context is illustrative. There, a 
study found that the more retirement plan options an employer 
provided, the greater the likelihood was that the employee would 
choose no plan at all.199 
In general, there is much evidence that when individuals are 
given too many choices, they decide not to make purchases.200  
Complexity is a related problem. The more complex and 
therefore overwhelming a decision, the more an individual pre-
 
 197. See Chernev et al., Choice Overload: A Conceptual Review and Meta-
Analysis, J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 333–58 (2015). 
 198. BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE — WHY MORE IS LESS 
(2004); Benjamin Scheibehenne et al., Can There Ever Be Too Many Options? A 
Meta-Analytic Review of Choice Overload, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 409 (2010); 
Steve Chapman, The Return of Old-Fashioned Paternalism: Will Limiting Our 
Choices Save Us From Ourselves?, REASON (Aug. 7, 2008), https://www.reason 
.com/2008/08/07/the-return-of-old-fashioned-pa [https://perma.cc/Q9ZJ-MG49]. 
 199. Sheena Sethi-Iyengar et al., How Much Choice is Too Much? Contribu-
tions to 401(k) Retirement Plans, in PENSION DESIGN AND STRUCTURE: NEW 
LESSONS FROM BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 83–95 (Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. 
Utkus eds., 2004). 
 200. See, e.g., Tori DeAngelis, Too Many Choices?, 35 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 
56, 56 (2004) (“[T]oo many choices can overwhelm us to the point where we 
choose nothing at all.”); Barry Schwartz, More Isn’t Always Better, 84 HARV. 
BUS. REV. June 2006, at 22 (“Research now shows that there can be too much 
choice; when there is, consumers are less likely to buy anything at all.”); Amos 
Tversky & Eldar Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Deci-
sion, 3 PSYCHOL. SCI. 358, 358 (1992) (arguing that “people are more likely to 
defer choice when conflict [i.e. differing options] is high than when it is low”). 
But see Jesse Marczyk, Is Choice Overload a Real Thing?, PSYCHOL. TODAY 
(Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/pop-psych/201602/is 
-choice-overload-real-thing [https://perma.cc/MC4N-U6UU] (arguing that re-
cent studies “cast doubt on the phenomenon” of “choice overload as being a real 
thing”). 
  
1472 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1429 
 
 
fers not to have to make the decision—and the poorer the deci-
sion-making process if the individual does choose to partici-
pate.201  
Choice of a health plan is a complex endeavor, even with the 
ACA’s attempts to simplify the process.202 Aside from the stand-
ard decision inputs of premium cost and risk of certain health 
outcomes, choosing a policy requires an understanding of a com-
plicated list of benefits. Individuals must understand the terms 
“deductible,” “co-pay,” “co-insurance,” “out-of-pocket maximum,” 
and must be able to understand the import of in-network and 
out-of-network care.203 An individual’s preferred provider may 
be in-network on one plan but out-of-network on another. Cer-
tain policies may cover particular pharmaceuticals that others 
do not.204 And the list of decision inputs goes on. The process of 
actually applying for benefits can also be complicated.205 
While there has been limited study of this issue in the con-
text of health insurance specifically,206 it is not hard to imagine 
 
 201. See Liebman & Zeckhauser, supra note 152, at 237–39 (“[C]onsumers 
have trouble making wise decisions when faced with such complex consumption 
choices.”); cf. The Importance of The Decision Making Process, EVERYDAY 
HEALTH, https://www.everydayhealth.com/neurology/importance-decision 
-making-process/ [https://perma.cc/KFF5-LTYR] (last updated Nov. 15, 2017) 
(advocating step-by-step, reasoned decision making).  
 202. See, e.g., The ‘Metal’ Categories: Bronze, Silver, Gold & Platinum, 
HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/choose-a-plan/plans-categories/ 
[https://perma.cc/94WY-AVYL] (detailing the robustness of the differing 
healthcare policies by classifying them as “metals” (bronze, silver, gold, or plat-
inum)). 
 203. See Health Insurance Basics: The 101 Guide to Health Insurance, POL-
ICYGENIUS, https://www.policygenius.com/health-insurance/learn/health 
-insurance-basics-and-guide/, [https://perma.cc/4BPC-PT5H]. 
 204. See Elissa Suh, Why Prescription Drug Coverage Matters, POLICYGE-
NIUS (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.policygenius.com/health-insurance/ 
prescription-drug-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/V35B-927N]. 
 205. See, e.g., KETCHUM & LAKE RESOURCE PARTNERS, supra note 141, at 
11–13 (detailing barriers to Medicaid and CHIP access); Anna Aizer, Public 
Health Insurance, Program Take-Up, and Child Health, 89 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
400, 412 (2007) (conducting empirical study relating to Medicaid barriers); see 
also Baicker et al., supra note 128, at 111 (“For example, lengthy applications 
and complex eligibility rules appear to depress enrollment in Medicaid, and as-
sistance with enrollment can improve participation.”); Stuber et al., supra note 
141, at 18 (identifying barriers and confusions hindering Medicaid enrollment).  
 206. For some of the limited examples available linking choice overload the-
ory to health insurance, see Jennifer L. Matjasko et al., Applying Behavioral 
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how choice overload and complexity may depress rates of insur-
ance enrollment.  
With these reasons why individuals choose not to purchase 
health insurance in mind, the next Part proposes a menu of pri-
vate law solutions intended to address purchase deterrents. 
IV.  SURVEY OF SOLUTIONS   
Policymakers seeking to change consumer behavior gener-
ally have two options: command-and-control regulation207 or the 
use of incentives or “nudges” to make choices more attractive to 
consumers.208 Given the backlash against the mandate as being 
too coercive—even though it might be more properly categorized 
as an incentive—this final Part surveys ways to increase insur-
ance uptake in the vein of incentives and nudges. These solu-
tions are largely ones that insurers could implement with lim-
ited government intervention.209 They are alternative methods 
 
Economics to Public Health Policy: Illustrative Examples and Promising Direc-
tions, 50 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S13, S15, S17 (2016) (advocating for “nudges” 
that reduce choice selection for “markets such as . . . health insurance in which 
choices are numerous, complex, and hard to compare”); J. Michael McWilliams 
et al., Complex Medicare Advantage Choices May Overwhelm Seniors—Espe-
cially Those with Impaired Decision Making, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1786, 1786 (2011) 
(finding that Medicare Advantage enrollment rates initially increased with a 
number of plan options, but fell after passing a threshold); see also Salinas, su-
pra note 183, at 2 (identifying “a series of cognitive biases” and “why people 
choose, over and over, not to pay for insurance”). 
 207. See Daniel Schweppenstedde et al., Regulating Quality and Safety of 
Health and Social Care: International Experiences, 4 RAND HEALTH Q. 1 (2014), 
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmc5051969 [https://perma.cc/6FNB-WCF7] 
(“Command and control: implies direct enforcement by government (eg licensing 
professionals and facilities, enforcing performance standards).”). 
 208. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DE-
CISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS 4–6 (2008) (describing a 
nudge as something that “alters people’s behavior in a predictable way with-
out . . . significantly changing their economic incentives”); Cass R. Sunstein & 
Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1159, 1161–62 (2003) (describing “libertarian paternalism” as a system 
that “steer[s] people’s choices in directions that will improve the choosers’ own 
welfare” without choosing for them with “nudges”). Taxation may be considered 
a third category of policymaking options. See, Brian Galle, Tax, Com-
mand . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 837, 841–
42 (2014) (distinguishing nudges, even when made by taxing, from traditional 
regulation through tax). 
 209. See, e.g., Andrew G. Simpson, 9 Alternatives to Individual Health In-
surance Mandate; Will They Work?, INS. J. (Mar. 29, 2011), https://www 
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to prompt insurance enrollment in a world with no mandate210 
and without universal coverage, and they address several of the 
barriers to enrollment described in Part III.211  
 
.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2011/03/29/192080.htm [https://perma 
.cc/6C3N-ZZ2R] (“Most experts . . . agree that if the mandate is stripped from 
the law, then an alternative method or combination of methods to expand cov-
erage will be needed if the rest of the healthcare reform is to work.”). 
 210. Only one post-ACA policy proposal has gained any significant traction 
as a mandate alternative—the “continuous coverage” proposal. See The Future 
of U.S. Health Care: Replace or Revise the Affordable Care Act, RAND HEALTH 
CARE, https://www.rand.org/health-care/key-topics/health-policy/in-depth.html 
[https://perma.cc/G5JA-9RK7] (outlining the “continuous coverage” proposal); 
see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY 
& U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REFORMING AMERICA’S HEALTHCARE SYSTEM 
THROUGH CHOICE AND COMPETITION (2018), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/ 
files/Reforming-Americas-Healthcare-System-Through-Choice-and 
-Competition.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER6W-DUCH] (arguing for “better value 
through choice and competition”). The basic premise of the proposal is that in-
dividuals have to be continuously insured without a significant break in cover-
age. See RAND HEALTH CARE, supra. If they are, then the protections in the ACA 
of guaranteed issue and community rating continue to apply. See id. Depending 
on the version of the proposal, lapses could justify insurance companies in deny-
ing coverage entirely or in charging significantly higher rates. See American 
Health Care Act of 2017, H.R. 1628, 115th Cong. § 133 (2017) (passed by the 
House of Representatives on May 5, 2017, but failed to pass in the Senate); see 
also Leigh Ann Caldwell, Obamacare Repeal Fails: Three GOP Senators Rebel 
in 49–51 Vote, NBC NEWS (July 28, 2017, 12:45 AM), https://www.nbcnews 
.com/politics/congress/senat-gop-effort-repeal-obamacare-fails-n787311 [https:// 
perma.cc/5F3X-8M5N]. One problem is that the proposal penalizes individuals 
for the decision to reenroll and not the decision to let their insurance lapse in 
the first place. See RAND HEALTH CARE, supra. While continuous coverage may 
deter lapses, it more strongly deters individuals from purchasing insurance if 
they have lapsed, when it would be more desirable to encourage reenrollment 
as soon as possible. 
 211. See supra Part III. Prior to the ACA, Paul Starr proposed an interesting 
legislative alternative to the mandate. See Paul Starr, The Opt-Out Compro-
mise: How to Let Individuals Out of the Insurance Mandate and Improve the 
Odds of Health-Care Reform, AM. PROSPECT (Mar. 9, 2010), https://prospect 
.org/article/opt-out-compromise-0 [https://perma.cc/EWP9-KPBF] (describing a 
two-part system that first “let[s] people opt out of the new insurance system if 
they sign a form on their tax return waiving their right to federal health-insur-
ance subsidies for a fixed period—five years. The second part of the proposal is 
to raise the annual penalties for those of the uninsured who want to keep open 
the possibility of buying coverage at any time”). One more possibility worth 
mentioning is the adoption of individual mandates by some states. See Study: 
State-Level Individual Mandates Would Reduce Number of Uninsured by Nearly 
4 Million in 2019; Health Plan Premiums Would Fall 12 Percent, COMMON-
WEALTH FUND (July 18, 2018), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/press 
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This Part starts first with a discussion of insurer-focused so-
lutions such as offering new products that might be attractive to 
younger and healthier policyholders: low introductory rate, long-
term insurance contracts; return of premium-style policies; fur-
ther simplified plan offerings; and experimenting with a gener-
osity frame for insurance purchases. It then moves on to a dis-
cussion of the automatic enrollment option. No one option is the 
silver bullet that will turn our market-based system into one of 
universal coverage. But particularly if used in combination, or 
targeted correctly based on an individual’s reason for being un-
insured, they may significantly improve upon the status quo.  
A. PREDATORY TO SALUTARY: CO-OPTING PREVIOUSLY 
MALICIOUS PRACTICES FOR GOOD 
One of the important reasons that young, healthy people 
currently do not buy policies is because premium rates are too 
high relative to their predicted expenses (or too high gener-
ally).212 Although there is always risk that a young and healthy 
person may have an unexpected change in health status that 
would cause significantly higher than predicted expenses, for 
most people in this risk category, they will be paying more than 
their fair actuarial share.213 This reality is hard to counteract 
because it requires individuals to make decisions (at least seem-
ingly) against personal interest.214 However, for ACA markets to 
work, healthy individuals must enroll in policies.215 And there is 
broader societal benefit to enrolling larger numbers of these in-
dividuals. Arguably, there is also individual benefit in a healthy 
person having insurance in that it protects against the parade of 
 
-release/2018/study-state-level-individual-mandates-would-reduce-number-un-
insured-nearly-4 [https://perma.cc/RPN9-JNAC] (arguing that other states 
would benefit by mimicking Massachusetts and New Jersey’s health insurance 
mandates); see also Shane Hoffman, Comment, Individual Mandates, Take 
Two: Incentivizing State-Based Individual Health Insurance Mandates Under 
the Spending Power, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 827, 829 (suggesting conditioning Med-
icaid funding on state adoption of an individual mandate).  
 212. See Rivkin Jr., supra note 10, at 94. 
 213. Id.  
 214. However, the reason that insurance exists in the first place is that it is 
near impossible to know in advance who will need the insurance and who will 
not. 
 215. See supra notes 95–98 and accompanying text.  
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horribles that ensues should they unexpectedly incur high med-
ical costs.216  
This first proposal suggests looking to industry practices 
that have successfully prompted consumers to make decisions 
against interest: offering low introductory rates and then locking 
consumers into long-term contracts with limited exit rights. 
These commercial practices work in part because they exploit 
known consumer biases. 
Consider a ten-year policy with a low introductory rate that 
applies for the first three years, with a schedule of reasonable 
rate increases pre-disclosed for years four through ten.217 Low 
introductory rates have proven enticing to consumers, in part 
because of hyperbolic discounting.218 In studies where it would 
be more financially advantageous for individuals to choose a con-
stant rate, they have nonetheless chosen an option with a lower 
introductory rate that later increases, even when it results in 
them paying more over the life of the policy.219 This may be be-
 
 216. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 217. A five-year policy is also worth considering. 
 218. Consider, for example, how cable companies successfully encourage 
sign up by offering special discounts at the start. See, e.g., You May Be Qualified 
to Save More on Your Cable Bill, TECH., https://www.inmyarea.com/resources/ 
cable-tv/cable-provider-discounts-might-not-know [https://perma.cc/4PB4 
-SSFJ] (“Cable TV providers are constantly coming out with new deals and pro-
motions to bring in more customers. Just turn on the TV, open a newspaper, or 
simply visit their website, and you’ll find ads for different packages at reduced 
prices.”).  
 219. See, e.g., Patrick M. Corrigan, “Abusive” Acts and Practices: Dodd-
Frank’s Behaviorally Informed Authority over Consumer Credit Markets and Its 
Application to Teaser Rates, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 170–74 
(2015) (describing Shui & Ausubel’s credit card study to show “that consumers 
misunderstand the teaser rate offers” (citing Haiyan Shui & Lawrence M. Au-
subel, Time Inconsistency in the Credit Card Market (Jan. 30, 2005) (un-
published manuscript), http://www.ausubel.com/creditcard-papers/time 
-inconsistency-credit-card-market.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EGT-RZMU])); see 
also GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, FED. RESERVE BD. & GEO. WASH. UNIV., IMPLICA-
TIONS OF BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH FOR THE USE AND REGULATION OF CONSUMER 
CREDIT PRODUCTS 2 (2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2010/ 
201025/201025pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/J6CP-JBYD] (“Consumers simplify, 
take shortcuts, and use heuristics, which may not always be optimal.”). 
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cause of calculation difficulties or it may be simply because con-
sumers prefer the lower price now (instant gratification) even if 
they know that it means a higher price down the road.220 
Actuarially, a low introductory price model might be de-
signed to be equivalent to a single, higher rate averaged over ten 
years, but it is more attractive to consumers framed as a low-
entry rate with pre-disclosed, planned rate increases.221 This 
pricing scheme also has the advantage of likely better mapping 
onto ability to pay over time, particularly as individuals move 
from their twenties into their thirties. Therefore it addresses not 
only hyperbolic discounting but also affordability issues. 
Many industries have previously designed contracts that ex-
ploit the hyperbolic discounting phenomenon—consider sub-
prime mortgages that offered low initial rates that increased 
over time or consumer credit cards that draw in customers with 
promises of low introductory rates that later increase.222 Gener-
ally, regulators have viewed such “traps” unfavorably as con-
sumer irrationality regarding these products has led to both in-
dividual and societal harms.223 The subprime mortgage crisis 
can be explained, in part, by consumers being enticed to get 
 
 220. Genevieve Selden, Time Inconsistency, INTELLIGENT ECONOMIST, 
https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/time-inconsistency/ [https://perma.cc/ 
K9TC-7DZS] (last updated May 3, 2019) (“Decision-makers are often biased to-
ward their present selves and thus put a greater weight on the choice that will 
currently benefit them. Those people discount the benefits of choices increas-
ingly with time . . . . [T]hey put less . . . weight on the benefits of a choice the 
farther out into the future that choice gets.”). 
 221. See supra notes 219–20 and accompanying text. 
 222. See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, Exit from Contract, 6 J. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 151, 151–52 (2014) (describing “longstanding concern about 
possible abuse in consumer contracts”). 
 223. See, e.g., CFPB Finalizes Rule to Stop Payday Debt Traps, CONSUMER 
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about 
-us/newsroom/cfpb-finalizes-rule-stop-payday-debt-traps/ [https://perma.cc/ 
N558-B49K]; Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1375 
(2004) [hereinafter Bar-Gill, Seduction] (describing consumer irrationality or, 
as Bar-Gill says, “imperfect self-control”); Oren Bar-Gill, The Law, Economics 
and Psychology of Subprime Mortgage Contracts, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1073 
(2009) [hereinafter Bar-Gill, Subprime Mortgage] (“[T]he welfare loss to borrow-
ers [from the subprime mortgage crisis]—substantial in itself—is compounded 
by much broader social costs.”). 
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mortgages that they could not afford when rates later bal-
looned.224  
But the problem in those scenarios is that consumer biases 
led to bad outcomes, both as an individual matter and as a mat-
ter of public good. In fact, the mechanism was quite successful 
at achieving its commercial purposes.225 Here, in the case of 
health insurance, a low introductory rate, when combined with 
clear disclosure of subsequent rates, may serve an important, 
positive purpose.226 In addition to exploiting hyperbolic discount-
ing to prompt sign-up, it has the added consumer benefit of lock-
ing in a rate when rate increases can otherwise be unpredictable 
year-to-year. The mechanism of low introductory rates is still de-
ployed in many commercial contexts. Cable companies, for in-
stance, still routinely use this tactic to bring in new customers.227  
A long-term insurance contract with a lock-in mechanism—
such as an early termination penalty—is essential to the 
model.228 An early termination fee would deter early exit, with 
certain necessary exceptions such as for people who move out-
side the state or obtain employer-sponsored insurance.229 With-
out a lock-in penalty, consumers could take advantage of low 
 
 224. See Bar-Gill, Subprime Mortgage, supra note 223, at 1079 (“[T]he de-
sign of these [subprime mortgage] contracts can be explained as a rational mar-
ket response to the imperfect rationality of borrowers.”). 
 225. Id. at 1130 n.198 (“The success of such advertising proves the imperfect 
information, imperfect rationality of borrowers, or both.”). 
 226. Consider the incentives with life insurance—if you sign up early, you 
get a lower price. See Zack Sigel, Life Insurance Rates By Age, POLICYGENIUS 
(Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.policygenius.com/life-insurance/life-insurance 
-rates-by-age/ [https://perma.cc/XXM4-L669] (noting that if you sign up early for 
life insurance, you get a lower rate). Life insurance has nonetheless had diffi-
culty attracting younger policyholders. See, e.g., Volker Meier, Why the Young 
Do Not Buy Long-Term Care Insurance, 18 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 83 (1999). 
 227. See supra note 218.  
 228. Other countries use lock-in systems like this. For instance, it is common 
in Switzerland to sign five-year contracts that cannot be broken unless the in-
sured moves out of the country. See Avik Roy, Why Switzerland Has the World’s 
Best Health Care System, FORBES: APOTHECARY (Apr. 29, 2011), https://www 
.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2011/04/29/why-switzerland-has-the-worlds 
-best-health-care-system/#3c9274a67d74 [https://perma.cc/4PD3-B5PW]. 
 229. There might be some gaming of the system at the margins by people 
who purposely move to get out of a contract. If people obtain employer insurance 
to get out of a contract, though, on the whole that would be a good outcome. 
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prices and then move to a different insurer before prices go up.230 
And insurers would have to price policies higher to account for 
this possibility. Lock-in mitigates these problems, allowing in-
surers to plan on most insureds staying with the plan for its full 
length. 
Both longer-term contracts and lock-in would be a departure 
from the industry norm, and arguably from the law. Currently, 
policies are written for single, calendar years.231 The ACA is 
structured so that there is a yearly “open enrollment period,” 
where insurers sell policies for a “benefit year,”232 which is de-
fined as “a calendar year for which a health plan provides cover-
age for health benefits.”233 Nothing in federal law seems to re-
quire yearly contracts for employer-sponsored insurance. 
Nonetheless, there would be a strong industry norm to overcome, 
with annual open enrollment periods being typical of employer 
markets. The historical reason for one-year policies is likely that 
it allows insurers to adjust rates year-to-year in response to ac-
tual costs and that costs can be difficult to predict over longer 
time horizons.234 From the consumer perspective, one-year poli-
cies are good because they foster competition. An insurer under-
stands the possibility of insureds switching carriers at the end 
of the term and must (theoretically) deliver good service to 
prompt re-enrollment.  
But longer-term policies with lock-in also have a number of 
important advantages to consider over one-year plans.235 Per-
 
 230. See Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 222, at 153 (describing business 
luring away customers with special rates). 
 231. An exception being so-called “short-term” insurance plans currently fa-
vored by the Trump Administration. See Andrew M. Harris & John Tozzi, 
Trump Win on Health Plans Advances Effort to Undo Obamacare, BLOOMBERG 
(July 19, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-19/trump-s 
-short-term-health-insurance-rule-survives-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/7QC7 
-F93D]. 
 232. 45 CFR § 155.410(e) (2018). 
 233. Id. § 155.20 (2018). 
 234. Cf. Neil A. Doherty & James R. Garven, Insurance Cycles: Interest Rates 
and the Capacity Constraint Model, 68 J. Bus. 383, 383, 395 n.19 (1995) (dis-
cussing the annual insurance writing process). This was even more important 
when insurance companies could use information learned about the policy-
holder in the prior year to adjust rates, which is no longer possible with com-
munity rating. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 235. Guaranteed-renewable insurance is another option, however, it is not 
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haps most importantly, they give the insurer an incentive to pri-
oritize an insured’s long-term health. Now, insurers know the 
insured may be another carrier’s problem the next year.236 The 
insurer’s incentive with a one-year contract is to focus only on 
short-term health, not long-term health.237 And from an insurer 
perspective, long-term policies address the problem that people 
will buy flood insurance right after a flood but let it lapse if they 
do not experience a flood for a few years.238 A longer-term con-
tract, simply speaking, guarantees customers for longer periods.  
There are nonetheless challenges to this model. Longer-
term policies mean less competition and perhaps lower quality 
 
as helpful as long-term policies because consumers can still leave early, so in-
surers would still need to set rates higher to account for that possibility. See 
Roy, supra note 148 (“[F]orcing insurers to cover everyone with pre-existing con-
ditions drives premiums upward. If you know you can buy insurance after you’re 
sick, you have every incentive to drop out of the system now, and wait until 
you’re sick to buy.”). 
 236. Id. (“Under a five-year contract, the insurer has a much greater incen-
tive to make sure you stay healthy, because it will be more liable for the bills if 
your health deteriorates. One-year contracts, on the other hand, incentivize an 
insurer to simply hope that you don’t get sick, with little eye to the long term.”). 
Short-term insurance contracts, for example, are a contributing factor to the 
opioid crisis. See Joy Stephenson-Laws, Payors Share Responsibility for the Opi-
oid Epidemic, BUS. L. TODAY, (Oct. 18, 2018), https://businesslawtoday.org/ 
2018/10/payors-share-responsibility-opioid-epidemic/ [https://perma.cc/V6EV 
-N799]. 
 237. See, e.g., John H. Cochrane, Time-Consistent Health Insurance, 103 J. 
POL. ECON. 445, 447 (1995) (“But suppose that the consumer gets a long-term 
illness. He is now a long-term liability of the insurer, so the insurer has a strong 
incentive to get rid of him.”). There is a vast literature discussing the problem 
of insurer incentives in short-term contracts. See, e.g., Alain C. Enthoven et al., 
Going Dutch — Managed-Competition Health Insurance in the Netherlands, 357 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2421 (2007); John H. Goddeeris, Insurance and Incentives for 
Innovation in Medical Care, 51 S. ECON. J. 530 (1984); George Loewenstein et 
al., Behavioral Economics Holds Potential to Deliver Better Results for Patients, 
Insurers, and Employers, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1244 (2013); James C. Robinson, Pay-
ment Mechanisms, Nonprice Incentives, and Organizational Innovation in 
Health Care, 30 INQUIRY 328 (1993); Harold Schmidt et al., Carrots, Sticks, and 
Health Care Reform — Problems with Wellness Initiatives, 362 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. E3(1) (2010); Kevin G. Volpp et al., Redesigning Employee Health Incen-
tives — Lessons from Behavioral Economics, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED 388 (2011). 
 238. See Daniel Schwarcz & Peter Siegelman, Law and Economics of Insur-
ance, in 2 THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 481, 490–91 (Fran-
cesco Parisi ed., 2017). 
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of service.239 But this problem may be limited in a world where 
interests are, to a degree, aligned. The insured wants coverage 
to stay healthy, and the insurer also benefits from keeping in-
sureds healthy and therefore lowering longer-term claims costs. 
Lock-in contracts also come with their own challenges and 
have typically been criticized because they reduce competition 
and consumer choice.240 The reaction against cell phone compa-
nies that used to offer “free” phones in exchange for customers 
committing to a contract with an early termination fee is instruc-
tive.241 But as Omri Ben-Shahar and Oren Bar-Gill note, early 
termination fees (ETFs) are not necessarily bad for consumers. 
They explain: 
ETFs are part of lock-in contracts, in which consumers enjoy up-front 
discounts and sellers assume up-front losses. There is no a-priori rea-
son to think that higher up-front prices and lower ETFs are better, for 
consumers, than lower up-front prices and higher ETFs. And it is mis-
guided to argue that back-end ETFs overcompensate sellers, without 
considering the up-front discounts that cut into sellers’ profits.242 
There might be valid reasons that a consumer might freely 
choose a lock-in option, for instance in order to get a lower rate. 
The biggest concern is that consumers might fail to see the trade-
offs in agreeing to a long-term contract with limited exit rights. 
But this concern leads to people being insured for ten-year peri-
ods (or even three-year periods), and on that basis, it might be 
less objectionable.  
Some other challenges merit note, but are not insurmount-
able. For instance, consumers may view the individual market 
 
 239. See Bar-Gill, Seduction, supra note 223, at 1401 n.130, 1430 (“Compe-
tition is powerless in fighting lock-in.”). 
 240. See Xingzhu Liu et al., Contracting for Primary Health Services: Evi-
dence on Its Effects and a Framework for Evaluation, PHRPLUS 7–8 (2004), 
https://www.who.int/management/resources/finances/ContractingPrimary 
HealthServicesEvidence.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K55-XKP4] (“[T]he pitfalls crit-
ics have cited” include that “[t]he health sector has high asset specificity, which 
creates conditions and incentives for parties to act opportunistically . . . . Pro-
viders have a strong interest in seeing their contracts renewed, and purchasers 
may be locked into an unsatisfactory contract[ ]  . . . particularly if there are no 
alternative choices.”). This might be a deterrent to sign-up that the low intro-
ductory rate would have to counteract. 
 241. Bar-Gill & Ben-Shahar, supra note 222, at 164 n.12 (describing “bill 
shock” of cell phone early termination fee plans: “nearly half of cell phone us-
ers . . . do not know the amount of fees they are accountable for”). 
 242. Id. at 155. 
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as transitional—somewhere to get insured temporarily while 
hoping to again get an employer-sponsored policy.  Ultimately it 
is an empirical question how many consumers would be inter-
ested in a long-term plan, but the growth of the gig economy and 
of independent contractor-type positions suggests that there 
may be considerable demand.  Another challenge is that it will 
be difficult for insurers to accurately estimate costs over a 
longer-term policy rather than a shorter-term one, and they may 
be tempted to inflate prices because of uncertainty. To deal with 
future uncertainty, insurers might set premiums quite high in 
the later years of the 10-year term. But it can be done. The long-
term care insurance market, for instance, while rarely touted as 
a success story, has settled into more stable rates after an initial 
period of much volatility.243 Also, the switch from an actuarial 
fairness model to community rating that has already occurred 
under the ACA makes the rate-setting process simpler. And if a 
ten-year policy is too long a time horizon, a five-year policy might 
be more palatable. 
Another important hurdle to insurers experimenting with 
an offering like this, however, is the changes that might be re-
quired to the ACA, which now only allows insurers to charge 
younger insureds one-third the price of older insureds, and 
which seems to require plans that cover a one-year benefit pe-
riod.244 However, given that a low-rate, long-term plan with a 
 
 243. See Cheryl W. Munk, What You Need to Know About Hybrid Long-
Term-Care Insurance, WALL ST. J. REP.: RETIREMENT (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-you-need-to-know-about-hybrid-long-term 
-care-insurance-1542645000 [https://perma.cc/BM4J-8JPA] (describing the 
long-term-care market as “roiled by huge premium increases on policies priced 
several years ago,” but also noting that hybrid policies, which have grown more 
popular recently, “have been more stable over time”). Nonetheless, the long-
term care market is rarely considered a model of success as rates continue to be 
high relative to perceived value. See id. 
 244. See Hoffman, supra note 45, at 65–67 (“[T]he Health Reform Law [ ]  
allows older insured to be charged 3 times as much as younger insured.”). Oth-
ers have suggested that younger people would be better off just getting cata-
strophic coverage, which is the lowest-priced. See, e.g., Aly Keller, Everything 
You Need to Know About Catastrophic Health Insurance, STRIDE (Nov. 30, 
2018), https://blog.stridehealth.com/post/everything-about-catastrophic-health 
-insurance [https://perma.cc/P5JL-7LW6] (“If you’re young and healthy, you 
may find it hard to justify the cost of health insurance . . . . That’s where cata-
strophic health insurance comes in.”). But catastrophic coverage is very unsat-
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termination fee might address affordability concerns by taking 
advantage of time inconsistent preferences, it is worth further 
exploration.245  
B. RETURN OF PREMIUM POLICIES 
Another possibility addresses the optimism bias problem by 
borrowing a product idea from the life insurance sphere. Some 
life insurance companies sell “return of premium” term life in-
surance.246 The idea is that many young people are hesitant to 
purchase term life insurance. Statistically, a young person’s 
chances of dying in a typical life insurance term of fifteen to 
thirty years are low. People worry that they are just throwing 
away their money in buying a policy, even though rates are ap-
propriately lower for younger, and therefore lower-risk, peo-
ple.247 Alternatively, although risk of death is low probability, 
the consequences of early death for surviving loved ones can be 
very high.  
Life insurance companies designed a product intended to ad-
dress these concerns.248 Individuals agree to pay higher than av-
erage premiums for a policy. In exchange, if they are still living 
at the end of the term, the insurance company agrees to return 
the premiums the individual has paid. The insurance company 
 
isfying for young people looking to feel like they have gotten something in ex-
change for their investment. Cf. Timothy F. Harris & Aaron Yelowitz, Nudging 
Life Insurance Holdings in the Workplace, 55 ECON. INQUIRY 951, 958–59 
(2017), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ecin.12390 (noting a 
17% drop in under-35 life insurance purchases in the study). 
 245. Cf. Oren Bar-Gill, The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts, in 
N.Y.U. CTR. L. & ECON, Consumer Contracts: Behavioral Economics vs. Neoclas-
sical Economics: An Exchange Between Oren Bar-Gill and Richard A. Epstein 
10–12 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Working Papers No. 91, 2007) (noting that low teaser 
rates attract consumers, even if the long-term rates are not in their best inter-
ests (citing Shui & Ausubel, supra note 218)); Richard A. Epstein, The Neoclas-
sical Economics of Consumer Contracts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 803, 823–26 (2008) 
(describing market based mechanisms that influence rational consumers). 
 246. See Amy Danise, How Return-of-Premium Life Insurance Works, NERD-
WALLET (Feb. 23, 2016) https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/insurance/return-of 
-premium-life-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/YVJ8-C6BU]. 
 247. See, supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text. 
 248. See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 15, at 82 (discussing the rise of the 
“tontine life insurance” that paid life insurance survivors after a defined term). 
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benefits from being able to invest the higher-than-average pre-
miums for the fifteen- to thirty-year policy.249 The individual 
benefits from having coverage in case of early death and in get-
ting premiums back in the event they live. Individuals who are 
at a very low risk of dying are basically giving a long-term loan 
to insurance companies. But the framing of the return of pre-
mium policy, addressing the hyperbolic discounting, optimism, 
and regret bias concerns, prompts people to sign up who other-
wise would not have done so. 
The hesitation of young people to buy life insurance in many 
ways parallels the issues with health insurance. Tom Baker and 
Peter Siegelman made a similar connection almost ten years ago, 
noting that traditional health insurance does not appeal to 
“young invincibles” who view it as “a way to spend money for 
something the customer thinks he does not need.”250 The return 
of premium concept addresses the concern by promising to re-
turn the premiums paid in by insureds who do not use the bene-
fits.  
Some modifications would need to be made to adapt the con-
cept to the health insurance market. For instance, it is not desir-
able to tie the return of premium to $0 consumed in health care 
expenses. It would be a problem if return of premium policies 
deterred people from getting care even when it would benefit 
their longer-term health. So perhaps the premium return would 
be tied to expenses staying below a threshold. Insurers would 
still commit to pay for preventive care—vaccines, and the rou-
tine and recommended screenings like mammograms and colon-
oscopies.251 And using those benefits would not impact the return 
of the premium. Depending on policy length, an insurer might 
even be prompted to require preventive health to reduce long-
term expenses. The model might be that a certain percentage of 
 
 249. See Compare, Buy, & Learn About Return of Premium Life Insurance, 
POLICYGENIUS, https://www.policygenius.com/life-insurance/return-of 
-premium-life-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/EAV4-4QN5] (suggesting that re-
turn of premium policies generally contain an approximately 30% mark-up in 
premium rates over traditional term policies). 
 250. Baker & Siegelman, supra note 17, at 83.  
 251. For the most part, the ACA requires these services to now be offered 
free of cost anyway. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a) (2012) (“Coverage of preventive 
health services.”). 
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premiums gets returned if health expenses stay below a thresh-
old and preventive care is obtained, rather than returning the 
entirety of premiums as is typically the case with life insur-
ance.252 
Baker & Siegelman make their own analogy to the life in-
surance context, going back to a popular mid-nineteenth century 
offering called “tontine life insurance,” which “paid a deferred 
dividend to policyholders who timely paid their life insurance 
premiums for a specified period[.]”253 A traditional tontine does 
not guarantee the amount of the dividend (nor in some instances, 
the timeframe in which it will be paid). Rather, members of the 
risk pool who out-survive others split available funds and there-
fore receive a sort of “prize.” In the health insurance context, 
Baker & Siegelman suggest that “[t]he young invincibles who in 
fact turn out not to use very much insurance would share the 
dividend, while those who use more insurance would get their 
benefits from the policy exclusively in the form of the covered 
health care they received.”254 
The return of premium concept builds in many ways on the 
tontine idea in that it also attempts to address the same opti-
mism bias problem. Both approaches share the benefit of not re-
quiring government subsidy, instead relying on private insurers 
to prompt insurance uptake.  
There is a key difference between the return of premium 
concept and the tontine idea, however. For the tontine, the 
amount of the dividend is (generally) not fixed in advance 
whereas in the return of premium model, the amount to be re-
turned is predefined.255 There are pros and cons to both scenar-
ios. An optimistic consumer might assume that an unspecified 
dividend payout will be higher than it actually will be. And the 
insurer bears less risk if it does not pre-commit to the dividend. 
On the other hand, the guarantee in the return of premium 
 
 252. This idea is similar in intent to Baker and Siegelman’s proposal to en-
courage healthy people to buy insurance by bundling it with a prize if they do 
not need to use the insurance. Baker & Siegelman, supra note 15, at 89–91. 
 253. Id. at 85. 
 254. Id. at 89. 
 255. Id. at 89 (distinguishing tontines from endowment life insurance, in 
which the amount of the deferred dividend was fixed in advance). Baker and 
Siegelman, however, are open to whichever option market research suggests 
would be more effective. Id. 
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model might be more motivating for consumers, particularly 
those who do not trust insurers to determine the amount of the 
prize. And the framing of the ability to get premiums back might 
be particularly attractive to young people whose primary objec-
tion is having to pay the premiums in the first place. Further 
study would be required to assess which model would prompt 
more insurance purchase. 
Both ideas are worth further exploration. If these policies 
could prompt healthy people who would not ordinarily enter the 
risk pools at all to contribute premiums, even if essentially in the 
form of a loan, it would be beneficial. And having access to a pol-
icy that would provide preventive care is important to individual 
health. 
There are some additional downsides to acknowledge. The 
tontine and return of premium solutions do not address the af-
fordability issue. In fact, they may exacerbate that problem in 
the short term in that return of premium policies must charge 
somewhat higher-than-average premiums.256 The return of pre-
mium concept is also at odds with the earlier stated assumption 
that younger people prefer lower rates in the short-term. (Alt-
hough there is nothing stopping an insurer from crafting a re-
turn of premium style policy with rates that increase over a spec-
ified term.) And it adds complexity where simplification is 
preferred. 
For those who do not purchase insurance because they can-
not afford it, this solution would not be the right fit. But insurers 
have the benefit of data collection and segmented marketing. For 
reasons discussed earlier, many who can afford insurance still 
choose not to buy it.257 Addressing affordability would not 
prompt insurance enrollment for that group; rather, this solu-
tion may be more attractive. Because the styling of these plans 
seems to address some of the key reasons that people currently 
give for not enrolling, it is worthy of experimentation.258 
 
 256. See Danise, supra note 246. 
 257. See supra Parts I.B, II.C–D, III.A–B.  
 258. According to Baker & Siegelman, tontines were once quite popular. 
Baker & Siegelman, supra note 15, at 89; see also Howard Kunreuther & Mark 
Pauly, Insurance Decision-Making and Market Behavior, 1 FOUNDS. & TRENDS 
MICROECONOMICS 63, 91–92 (2005) (demonstrating consumer preference for in-
surance offering rebates). 
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C. FURTHER SIMPLIFIED PLAN OFFERINGS 
A third possibility is to address issues of choice overload and 
complexity259 in the current system by simplifying offerings or 
making default plan selections. To a degree, the ACA already 
tried to simplify choices by putting plans in a metallic category 
(platinum, gold, silver, bronze) according to their actuarial 
value.260 It is a shorthand for the degree of coverage a plan offers, 
with platinum plans offering more robust coverage and fewer 
out-of-pocket expenses and bronze plans covering less of the out-
of-pocket costs.261 But studies of the metal labels have found that 
they do little to elucidate choice for consumers.262 
And more generally, it is still incredibly challenging to un-
derstand and navigate health insurance choices, to the point 
that it may be deterring individuals from participating in the 
system at all.263 Charts of benefits are complicated and require 
understanding terminology about co-insurance, deductibles, co-
pays, out-of-pocket maximums, and so forth.264 Many individuals 
do not understand the terms and most have difficulty calculating 
 
 259. See, e.g., Cathy Schoen et al., Access, Affordability, and Insurance Com-
plexity Are Often Worse in the United States Compared to Ten Other Countries, 
32 HEALTH AFF. 2205, 2206 (2013) (“[T]he United States is unique in its com-
plexity of health insurance designs . . . .”). 
 260. See Sarah Sullivan, ACA Plan Metal Levels – What They Are, How They 
Work, HEALTHEDEALS (June 26, 2019), https://www.healthedeals.com/blog/ 
aca/obamacare-metal-plans/ [https://perma.cc/4ZX5-9C5M]; see also Metal Cat-
egories, supra note 202.  
 261. Sullivan, supra note 260. 
 262. See, e.g., Saurabh Bhargava et al., The Costs of Poor Health (Plan 
Choices) & Prescriptions for Reform, 3 BEHAV. SCI. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2017) (finding 
that “labels that more sensibly reflect the factors consumers ought to consider—
for instance, labels that emphasize gradations in the need for health care—do 
lead to significant improvements in the efficiency of plan choices”). 
 263. See Baicker et al., supra note 128 (surveying evidence).  
 264. See, e.g., Deductibles, Copayments, and Coinsurance, MEDICA, 
https://www.medica.com/-/media/documents/individual/member-tip-sheets/ifb 
-member-tips-deductibles-copays-coinsurance-ifb10082.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
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the expected costs of their care.265 The simple length of a benefit 
plan deters reading and understanding it.266  
Some insurers are already beginning to experiment with 
simplified offerings. A new health plan called “Humana Simplic-
ity” does away with deductibles and co-insurance entirely and 
uses a copay-only model.267 Covered services are subject to one 
of six copay amounts, making it easier for insureds to know how 
much they will owe in various scenarios.268 A study of the copay-
only model found that the simplified offerings improved plan 
choice—although the study did not consider the effect of simpli-
fication on the decision to enroll in the first place.269  
Another option is to simplify the process of plan selection 
through the use of artificial intelligence. For example, the Maya 
Intelligence platform is being marketed as using machine learn-
ing to help individuals choose the best health insurance coverage 
option based on their individual needs.270 In other words, it takes 
the individual out of the complicated decision-making process. 
One could even imagine a scenario where a simple algorithm 
could select the best plan option as an individual’s default.271 
This might work well with the auto-enrollment idea discussed 
further below. 
 
 265. Baicker et al., supra note 128 at 116.  
 266. Lauren Woods, Health Insurance Plans ‘Too Complicated to Under-
stand,’ UCONN TODAY (Apr. 5, 2017), https://today.uconn.edu/2017/04/health 
-insurance-plans-complicated-understand/# [https://perma.cc/DS76-95ML] 
(“[T]oday’s complex insurance plans, with intricate cost calculations and com-
plicated language and terminology, can be very difficult to understand, even for 
people with a college education.”). 
 267. Behavioral Economics, supra note 70. 
 268. Id. (describing the Humana Simplicity plan as having “six categories of 
copayments” and “[i]nstead of having a 70-page guide to benefits, everything 
fits on a page and a half ”). 
 269. See Loewenstein et al., Consumers’ Misunderstanding of Health Insur-
ance, 32 J. HEALTH ECON. 850, 856–60 (2013). 
 270. See Abbott Launches Its AI Based Personal Assistant, MAYA, ET 
HEALTHWORLD (Feb. 20, 2019), https://health.economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 
news/health-it/abbott-has-launched-its-ai-based-personal-assistant-maya/ 
68063221 [https://perma.cc/84VQ-6H7L]. Tools like this have the potential to 
exacerbate adverse selection concerns, but might at least help people over the 
hurdle of not purchasing insurance at all.  
 271. In other work, the author has explored the possibility of choosing treat-
ment defaults for patients to address issues of flawed decision-making. See Ep-
stein, supra note 155, at 1255. Choice of health plan could be done similarly. 
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Simply reducing the number of plan offerings by each in-
surer may also be advantageous in addressing choice overload. 
And to the extent that plans are more standardized, it would 
mitigate the effects of adverse selection where sicker people 
choose more robust plans, which then have to charge higher pre-
miums, and healthier people choose skinnier coverage. 
Not everyone is in favor of simplification, though. Large in-
surer Aetna, for instance, has opposed standardized plan designs 
on the basis that it would stifle their ability to create innovative 
plans.272 Indeed, some of the innovations urged in sections A and 
B above might add complexity in the form of more choices for the 
consumer. Choices could be offered on a more targeted basis, so 
that each individual consumer does not get overloaded with op-
tions, but that requires confidence that the data is driving the 
right matching.  
At bottom, more study needs to be done to determine 
whether complexity is deterring enrollment or just causing poor 
decision-making. If either is true, however, the case for simplifi-
cation is strong.  
D. GENEROSITY FRAMING 
Another option could take advantage of framing effects to 
prompt enrollment. Health insurance is currently marketed as a 
way to insure against individual risk.273 Any individual might 
incur health care costs that exceed premiums in a given period. 
Purchasing insurance and agreeing to pay premiums is supposed 
to be a rational economic choice to mitigate that risk. However, 
one of the problems, as previously discussed, is that many young 
and healthy individuals do not purchase insurance because they 
do not view it as a “good deal.”274 They believe that they will 
spend less in out-of-pocket health care costs than they would in 
premiums. And many of them are correct. After all, the reason 
that the risk pools require the addition of less expensive insureds 
is precisely to subsidize the cost of sicker insureds. In the current 
 
 272. Herman, supra note 62. 
 273. See Risk Pooling: How Health Insurance in the Individual Market 
Works, AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES (July 2017), http://www.actuary.org/files/ 
publications/RiskPoolingFAQ071417.pdf.  
 274. See Baker & Siegelman, supra note 15 at 96–97. 
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framing of the decision, perhaps it is not a surprise that many 
healthier individuals are opting out of insurance. 
At the same time, though, the prohibition on pre-existing 
conditions exclusions and the community rating provisions are 
highly popular because Americans view them as moral impera-
tives.275 People do not like the thought, and rightly so, that a 
child born with a disorder due to no fault of her own can be de-
nied insurance because she is expensive to insure.276 One possi-
bility, then, is to change the framing of the insurance purchase 
decision. One might purchase insurance not merely to insure 
against her future risk, but also explicitly to fund the care of 
sicker people in need of insurance coverage. 
The importance of framing to decision-making as a general 
matter was discussed above.277 We know that how a decision is 
framed can have a significant impact on decision-making out-
comes.278 But another fundamental conceit of the behavioral eco-
nomics literature is equally relevant to this solution—namely, 
that individuals do not always act strictly in their own self-in-
terest.279 Individuals are also generous and altruistic.280  
 
 275. Brietta Clark, A Moral Mandate & the Meaning of Choice: Conceiving 
the Affordable Care Act After NFIB, 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 267, 
316 (2013). 
 276. See Poll: The ACA’s Pre-Existing Condition Protections Remain Popular 
with the Public, Including Republicans, as Legal Challenge Looms This Week, 
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/press 
-release/poll-acas-pre-existing-condition-protections-remain-popular-with 
-public/ [https://perma.cc/E9YJ-9542] (“[Seventy-two percent of Americans] say 
it is ‘very important’ to retain ACA provisions that prevent insurance companies 
from . . . charging sick people more.”). 
 277. See discussion supra Part III.B.4. 
 278. See TVERSKY & KAHNEMAN, FRAMING OF DECISIONS, supra note 151.  
 279. See Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics: 
How Behavioral Economics Differs from Traditional Economics, LIBR. ECON. & 
LIBERTY, https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BehavioralEconomics.html 
[https://perma.cc/3482-VBVY]. 
 280. See Summer Allen, The Science of Generosity, GREATER GOOD SCI. CTR. 
2 (May 2018), https://ggsc.berkeley.edu/images/uploads/GGSC-JTF_White_ 
Paper-Generosity-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/H74M-LQ7J] (“[G]enerosity has 
its roots not just in our individual development but also in our very biology and 
evolutionary history.”); Jessica L. Collett & Christopher A. Morrissey, The So-
cial Psychology of Generosity: The State of Current Interdisciplinary Research, 
SCI. GENEROSITY (Oct. 2007), https://generosityresearch.nd.edu/assets/11794/ 
social_psycho/social_psychology_of_generosity.pdf [https://perma.cc/X9UE 
-ETMQ]; Jill Suttie, Can You Incentivize Generosity?, GREATER GOOD MAG. 
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In the real world, millennials in particular have demon-
strated strong altruistic tendencies.281 Millennials, who are 
mostly young and healthy, are the most sought-after population 
for purposes of insurance risk pools. Perhaps for this reason, 
products tying their sales to social movements and to themes of 
generosity have been particularly successful in recent years.282 
Consider the example of TOMS shoes.283 TOMS markets 
their shoes by telling consumers that for every pair of shoes the 
company sells, it will donate a pair to children in need.284 In or-
der to be able to donate shoes, TOMS must be charging custom-
ers more for a pair of shoes than it would without the donation 
commitment. People could buy other similar shoes for less 
money. But TOMS is explicitly trading on individuals’ altruistic 
tendencies. And the business model seems to be working, pri-
marily in selling to the younger population.285 In fact, other com-
panies have followed suit. Bombas socks, for instance, has a sim-
ilar business model.286 
 
(June 23, 2016), https://greatergood.berkeley.edu/article/item/can_you_ 
incentivize_generosity [https://perma.cc/KW5S-W4BW]. 
 281. See NAT’L CHAMBER FOUND., THE MILLENNIAL GENERATION: RE-
SEARCH REVIEW 4 (2012), https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/sites/default/ 
files/article/foundation/MillennialGeneration.pdf [https://perma.cc/VXN9 
-GBTV] (“Popular opinion is that Millennials are more caring, community ori-
ented, and politically engaged than previous generations.”); Wes Gay, Millenni-
als Are Effecting Change with Social Responsibility, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wesgay/2017/08/11/millennials-social 
-responsibility/#1cb0f49117d8 [https://perma.cc/536W-L7BB] (“Millennials are 
an idealistic, altruistic generation.”). 
 282. Jorie Goins, How Millennials Are Changing Corporate Generosity, CHI. 
TRIBUNE (June 24, 2019, 12:59 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/ 
business/success/tca-success-how-millennials-are-pushing-corporate 
-generosity-20190624-story.html [https://perma.cc/N5VY-5MXL]. 
 283. See TOMS, https://www.toms.com/ [https://perma.cc/ZX8L-T6GZ]. 
 284. Id. (“Your purchases have helped give 86 million pairs of shoes to chil-
dren in need. And they still do today. Shop the shoe that started the move-
ment.”). 
 285. See Leigh Buchanan, What’s Next for Toms, the $400 Million For-Profit 
Built on Karmic Capital, INC., https://www.inc.com/magazine/201605/leigh 
-buchanan/toms-founder-blake-mycoskie-social-entrepreneurship.html 
[https://perma.cc/L59D-R2JF] (describing TOMS’ philanthropic efforts and stra-
tegic focus on young people who care about their impact as reasons for its com-
mercial success). 
 286. See BOMBAS, https://bombas.com/pages/giving-back [https://perma.cc/ 
F2BW-77KB] (“[D]onated over 18 million clothing items through more than 
1,700 Giving Partners across the country.”); see also SOAPBOX, https:// 
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Drawing on these lessons, health insurance companies could 
change the decision frame for purchasing health insurance. Ra-
ther than just framing the decision as one of self-interest, insur-
ers could be explicit that a young and healthy policyholder who 
purchases a policy helps to fund insurance coverage for an indi-
vidual with a pre-existing condition. This combats the negative 
frame of “I’m paying too much for coverage relative to my own 
risk” and replaces it with a positive frame of “I’m doing a good 
thing in getting health insurance because I’m enabling a sick 
person to be able to get care.” And of course there is also still the 
individual benefit that the insured is covered in the event of 
high, unexpected medical costs. 
Just as with many attempts to nudge consumers into deci-
sions that a choice architect seeks, this framing may yield unde-
sired results or may fail to accomplish its purpose.287 For in-
stance, a consumer can purchase a pair of TOMS shoes for a lot 
less money than a year of health insurance premiums. It is pos-
sible that altruistic millennials are only willing to be generous 
up to a certain threshold, particularly as they often have more 
limited means than older consumers.  And it could deter some 
consumers who purchased policies as the rational economic 
choice.  
 
www.soapboxsoaps.com/ [https://perma.cc/FFC4-RQT5] (donating more than 
2,995,037 bars of soap); TWICE AS WARM, https://twiceaswarm.com/ [https:// 
perma.cc/2V78-TBR4] (“With each purchase, a new winter clothing item is given 
to a person in need: Wear One, Give One.”). For a list of similar business models 
donating with each purchase, see Shawn Donnelly, 16 Brands That Use the 
TOMS Model of One-for-One Giving, INSIDEHOOK, (Nov. 28, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.insidehook.com/article/food-and-drink/16-brands-use-toms-model 
-one-one-giving/ [https://perma.cc/9222-8APJ]. 
 287. Successful results from incentivizing generosity typically rely on public 
trust. See Herrington J. Bryce, The Public’s Trust in Nonprofit Organizations: 
The Role of Relationship Marketing and Management, NPQ (Jan. 11, 2016), 
https://nonprofitquarterly.org/the-publics-trust-in-nonprofit-organizations-the 
-role-of-relationship-marketing-and-management/ [https://perma.cc/CZ9N 
-4EYZ] (discussing the role of trust in relationships between consumers and 
charity); see also America’s Least-Respected Industries: How Does Insurance 
Fare?, INS. BUS. (June 16, 2015), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/ 
us/news/breaking-news/americas-leastrespected-industries-how-does 
-insurance-fare-16552.aspx [https://perma.cc/FJ9H-2E62] (citing Harris Poll 
finding out of 2,250 surveyed adults, only 7% trust their health insurance com-
pany). 
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Also, while TOMS shoes began from day one by marketing 
itself as a company that sought to do good, individuals may al-
ready be highly skeptical of the motivations of insurance compa-
nies, which are mostly viewed as greedy and self-serving.288 One 
could see skepticism about whether funds are really being used 
for the sick or rather to pad the salaries of overpaid insurance 
company CEOs.289 Perhaps a newly formed, non-profit insurance 
company would be more successful in changing the framing than 
a large, well-known, profit-driven company.290 But at the very 
least, this generosity frame seems worthy of experimentation.291  
E. AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT WITH OPT-OUT 
Finally, the concept of automatic enrollment is not a new 
one, but it merits serious new consideration. Individuals may not 
be enrolling in insurance plans because the status quo is not to 
be enrolled. An individual has to take affirmative action and 
wade through all of the choices and all of the complexity involved 
in making a decision about whether to purchase a policy. 
 
 288. See Healthcare System, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/4708/ 
healthcare-system.aspx?version=print [https://perma.cc/Q7XV-YYB9] (finding 
48% of Americans have a very/somewhat negative view of the healthcare indus-
try and a 2009 poll finding 13% of Americans believe the biggest problem with 
healthcare in the U.S. is insurance companies’ greed). 
 289. If insurance companies move to a non-profit or mutual status, then they 
could potentially ameliorate public skepticism and distrust. See Bryce, supra 
note 287 (outlining steps that non-profits can take to restore public trust and 
image). 
 290. This might be a good role for a Certified B Corporation, for instance. 
See CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/ [https://perma.cc/45HH 
-W7NT]. 
 291. There might be other frames also worthy of experimentation. Consider, 
for instance, a personal responsibility frame—in the context that human beings 
are personally responsible for maintaining insurance so as not to impose nega-
tive externalities on the rest of society. See, e.g., Brownell et al., Personal Re-
sponsibility and Obesity: A Constructive Approach to a Controversial Issue, 29 
HEALTH AFF. 379, 382 (2010) (advocating “[t]he use of collective action to sup-
port personal responsibility” as a way to address the obesity crisis). Perhaps 
ironically, Governor Mitt Romney successfully sold the individual mandate to 
Massachusetts using the value of personal responsibility. When he introduced 
his proposal for Massachusetts in 2005, he stated: “It’s the ultimate conserva-
tive idea . . . that people have responsibility for their own care, and they don’t 
look to government . . . when they can afford to take care of themselves.” Mar-
tha Bebinger, Personal Responsibility: How Mitt Romney Embraced the Individ-
ual Mandate in Massachusetts Health Reform, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2105, 2109 
(2012).  
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One way then to address the status quo, or inertia, bias and 
the concerns about complexity is to automatically enroll individ-
uals in plans, but then allow them to opt-out if they desire.292 
There is now evidence from a wide variety of sectors that many 
people will simply stick with decisions that have been made for 
them.293 Perhaps the most analogous example to the insurance 
enrollment context is the studies about employee participation 
in 401(k) plans. Enrollment in such plans dramatically increases 
when employers automatically enroll employees but allow them 
to opt out.294  
The ACA, as enacted, contained an automatic enrollment 
provision for large employers.295 The concept was that employers 
would automatically enroll employees in one of the employer-
sponsored plans and give them the right to change the selection 
or opt out entirely. The idea was to increase participation in em-
ployer-sponsored insurance.296 But its implementation was post-
poned and ultimately it was repealed in 2015.297 
The employer automatic enrollment provision never got off 
the ground for a number of reasons. First, businesses generally 
opposed it.298 They viewed automatic enrollment as administra-
tively difficult and costly to execute. Second, some businesses 
 
 292. See Adams, supra note 96; An Alternative to the Individual Mandate, 
FLEX (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.flexiblebenefit.com/blog/alternative 
-individual-mandate [https://perma.cc/5DMU-YEMQ]; Lanhee J. Chen & James 
C. Capretta, Republicans Need a Nudge to Lower Health Care Costs, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/12/opinion/health-care 
-automatic-enrollment.html. 
 293. See, e.g., Carlos Alós-Ferrer et al., Inertia and Decision Making, 7 FRON-
TIERS PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (2016); see also discussion infra Part III.B.1.  
 294. Madrian & Shea supra note 165, at 1176. 
 295. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 1511, 124 Stat. 252 (2010) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 218A (2012) (repealed 2015)) 
(mandating that large firms must automatically enroll new employees into em-
ployer-provided health plans).  
 296. Timothy Jost, Budget Legislation Would Repeal Auto-Enrollment Re-
quirement for Large Employers, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Oct. 27, 2015), https:// 
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20151027.051444/full/ [https://perma 
.cc/Y2MZ-JF5N] (describing employer automatic enrollment provision as a 
“nudge” that was “intended to reverse the course of inertia and encourage en-
rollment in coverage by employees who might otherwise forgo doing so if they 
had to initiate enrollment on their own”). 
 297. Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-74, 129 Stat. 584 (2015). 
 298. See, e.g., Letter from Various Businesses, Trade Associations, and Or-
ganizations to Johnny Isakson, Senator, U.S. Senate (July 22, 2014), 
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said that they feared “unnecessary hardship” on employees who 
were automatically enrolled in a plan but did not wish to be.299 
Third, many employers were already automatically re-enrolling 
employees during open enrollment, so the provision was limited 
in effect to new employees, a small group that perhaps did not 
merit the costs entailed.300 Finally, the automatic enrollment 
provision was considered duplicative of the individual mandate. 
If a penalty for failure to enroll was providing incentive to enroll, 
then it was not also necessary to automatically enroll people in 
plans.301 
But in a world where there is no longer an individual man-
date penalty, automatic enrollment deserves further considera-
tion—and not just for employer-sponsored health insurance, but 
also for the individual market. If it were possible for the govern-
ment to identify the twenty-seven million people who do not have 
insurance and to automatically enroll them in a plan, it could 
significantly increase rates of insurance. 
There are a number of downsides to consider, though. The 
first and perhaps most important concerns data difficulties. 
While employers could automatically enroll new employees and 
their uninsured beneficiaries, it is harder to identify the unin-
sureds who lack an employer-sponsored insurance option. One 
suggestion is to design a process that could be implemented 
through the DMV or for states to require some sort of infor-
mation collection on insurance status. The government has in-
formation on who is enrolled in Medicare, Medicaid, or who has 
coverage through the Veterans Administration, and through the 
IRS, employer coverage could also be determined. The uninsured 
could largely be identified by process of elimination.302  
 
https://www.shrm.org/ResourcesAndTools/hr-topics/benefits/Documents/ 
S2546EmployerSupportLetter.pdf [https://perma.cc/3CT2-S4M4] (more than 
one hundred businesses writing in favor of the Auto Enroll Repeal Act). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. (“[T]he automatic enrollment requirement is redundant, expensive 
and unnecessarily burdensome for employers without increasing employees’ ac-
cess to coverage.”). 
 301. Id. (“[E]mployers that are subjected to the [Automatic Enrollment for 
Employees of Large Employers provision] are already bound by the health care 
law’s Shared Responsibility for Employers provision, which requires an offer of 
coverage to these same employees . . . .”). 
 302. The government also has historical evidence on which individuals did 
not have insurance previously and therefore paid the individual mandate tax. 
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Another possible stumbling block to automatic enrollment 
concerns the paternalistic nature of the strong nudge in favor of 
insurance. The paternalism concern is perhaps even heightened 
when the direction of the nudge may benefit the public, but is 
not necessarily in the individual’s self-interest.303 Typically, 
nudges are designed to move individuals toward decisions that 
would be in their rational self-interest, not decisions that might 
be contrary to that interest.304 Political opposition to a strong 
nudge like automatic enrollment may be problematic. Notably, 
while many countries have successfully adopted opt-out organ 
donation regimes, the United States has continued to resist what 
might arguably be a less controversial nudge than automatic in-
surance enrollment.  
But this need not be paralyzing. Because of the right to opt-
out, any coercion is minimal.305 And even if an individual might 
be paying more than actuarially necessary, having health insur-
ance is arguably still an individual benefit and is certainly a pub-
lic benefit. 
Consideration would also need to be given to billing mecha-
nisms and enforcement. With employer automatic enrollment, 
funds can be deducted from wages to cover the cost of insurance. 
With private insurance, however, companies would have to bill 
consumers and hope that they pay. Or perhaps there is a way to 
invoke the tax system, but then automatic enrollment starts to 
sound like the repealed mandate. 
The next question concerns what plan to automatically en-
roll people in, given that the “best” plan for an individual is typ-
ically viewed as a personal decision. Some options are that a de-
fault plan could be established (by the employer or by the state), 
 
 303. See Jacob Goldin, Which Way to Nudge? Uncovering Preferences in the 
Behavioral Age, 125 YALE L.J. 226, 233 (2015). 
 304. See Paternalism, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Feb. 12, 2017), 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/paternalism/#DefiIssu [https://perma.cc/ 
8359-YBWD] (“There are nudges which are not paternalistic (on [Sunstein and 
Thaler’s] definition) because the aim is to promote the general good—even if the 
chooser is not benefitted. Nudging building managers to put in elevators with 
braille buttons, influencing people to contribute to Oxfam by putting up pictures 
of starving infants, are examples where the good to be promoted is the welfare 
of people other than those being influenced.”). 
 305. See, e.g., Wendy Netter Epstein, The Health Insurer Nudge, 91 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 593, 650 (2018) (discussing objections to paternalistic nudges). 
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or the individual could be enrolled in the lowest-cost plan.306 In-
deed, automatic enrollment seems most likely to be successful if 
individuals can be enrolled in plans with very low cost.307 For 
those who are eligible for subsidies and are simply not accepting 
those subsidies, this seems possible. But for higher income indi-
viduals, even the lowest-cost plans may still be pricey. 
The success of automatic enrollment is also predicated on an 
assumption that status quo bias explains why so many are un-
insured. If, instead, most people are making a conscious choice 
not to enroll in insurance, then automatic enrollment would just 
add unnecessary cost in the form of forcing large numbers of peo-
ple to opt out. While there is sufficient data to be optimistic,308 
ultimately, the degree of inertia exhibited depends largely on 
context, and some limited experimentation could provide helpful 
data. 
  CONCLUSION   
There is much excitement on the political left about the pos-
sibility of moving to a single-payer, universal-coverage model in 
health care. And there is excitement on the right about doing 
away with the ACA and moving to a more market-driven ap-
proach to health care. But there are serious stumbling blocks in 
 
 306. In a future world, big data and artificial intelligence can play a part in 
selecting the right plan for the right individual. 
 307. Goldin, supra note 303 at 233; see also Wesley J. Smith, Obamacare 
Repeal: The NEJM Starts to Panic, FIRST THINGS (Feb. 17, 2011), https://www 
.firstthings.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2011/02/obamacare-repeal-the-nejm-starts 
-to-panic [https://perma.cc/Y8RV-4722] (“‘Inertia alone may not be a sufficiently 
strong force to get younger, healthier workers to stay insured, given high and 
rising insurance premiums.’”(quoting Jonathan Oberlander, Under Siege—The 
Individual Mandate for Health Insurance and Its Alternatives, 364 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 1085, 1086 (2011))). 
 308. See Benjamin R. Handel, Adverse Selection and Inertia in Health Insur-
ance Markets: When Nudging Hurts, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 2643 (2013) (finding 
evidence of status quo bias in health insurance in that people tend to stick with 
their original choice of health insurance policy even if another option would be 
better for them); see also James Marton et al., Medicaid Program Choice, Inertia 
and Adverse Selection, 56 J. HEALTH ECON. 292 (2017) (finding inertia effect in 
Medicaid plan choice); Keith M. Marzilli Ericson, Consumer Inertia and Firm 
Pricing in the Medicare Part D Prescription Drug Insurance Exchange, 6 AM. 
ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 38 (2014) (finding inertia effect in Medicare Part D 
choice); Gordon B. Dahl & Silke J. Forbes, Doctor Switching Costs in Health 
Insurance (unpublished manuscript), http://faculty.weatherhead.case.edu/ 
forbes/Dahl_Forbes_Draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/96CJ-Z8A4]. 
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the way. With a politically-divided Congress, any major changes 
are not imminent. It is time to deal with the current situation—
with the ACA that is still in place, but now lacking the individual 
mandate penalty. This change is almost certain to result in a 
significant increase in uninsured Americans, which in turn will 
raise the rates on premiums and further destabilize individual 
insurance markets (even if they are not likely to crash). More 
globally, it is time to explore ways to address the seemingly in-
tractable problem of high rates of uninsured. Options exist to 
prompt health insurance enrollment, perhaps even ones that 
could garner support across a broad swath of interests. Many of 
these options are ones that insurance companies could experi-
ment with, without needing major legal changes to do so. Alt-
hough no single option is perfect, there is reason for optimism. 
Private law alternatives to the individual mandate could miti-
gate a host of negative consequences that will flow from the man-
date’s repeal if no substitutes are implemented. 
 
